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Abstract 
This thesis looks at the New Zealand's external relations in the period 1942-
1952 and in particular the degree of independence, from other countries, 
exercised by the Government in Wellington when deciding external affairs 
policies. This is done by looking at two case studies, firstly New Zealand's 
participation in the Pacific War and the subsequent national involvement in the 
surrender and occupation of Japan. The second case study is the decision to 
seek a post-war security arrangement with the United States of America. 
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It will be shown that New Zealand did act independent of any other nation when 
formulating policy and did not simply 'do what it was told' by the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Australia or any other state. 
Chapter One: 
Introduction 
The period 1942-1952 witnessed great change in New Zealand's external 
affairs. There was much to necessitate this change, not the least being the 
prosecution of the Pacific war to its successful conclusion, the emergence of the 
United States as the world's premier power concurrently with the decline in 
influence of the United Kingdom. The United Nations was formed at San 
Francisco in the hope of preventing further wars while at the same time 
communism, much to the worry of western nations, spread from the confines of 
the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe and China. 
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This period could be loosely described as the "adolescent"" period of New 
Zealand's post war external affairs policy. This is because it was a time when 
New Zealand moved away from 'the Mother Country.' (i.e. the United Kingdom) 
to make its own way in the field of external relations. The term 'loosely' is used 
as it was a period of transition for New Zealand as influences other than those of 
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth emerged to conclude with the signing of 
the ANZUS Pact in 1952. 
During this period, New Zealand still showed a willingness to align itself along 
side much larger states, firstly with its traditional partner the United Kingdom, but 
as circumstances changed the United States became more important. In both 
instances there has been criticism that New Zealand was simply 'following the 
leader,' pursuing polices that served other nations first and itself later. 
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It is axiomatic that national security is a prime responsibility of any government. 
It is equally so, therefore, that decisions taken by any government with respect to 
national security should provide an indication of dependence or independence in 
the field of external relations. 
This thesis will study two major security issues of this period to ascertain 
whether there was independent decision making by the government in 
Wellington. The first will review New Zealand's involvement in the Pacific War, 
the assignment or otherwise of critical land forces, and the subsequent national 
involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan. The second will study 
New Zealand's decision to seek a security guarantee from the United States of 
America which led to the ANZUS Pact. Both case studies are linked by the 
perception at the time of the serious threat to national security posed by Japan. 
The following questions will be asked when looking at the two case studies: 
• Was New Zealand acting independently when it decided upon its course of 
action? 
• Was New Zealand making its decision for New Zealand's interests first or for 
other nations? 
• What was New Zealand hoping to achieve with its policy? 
• Did New Zealand achieve its goals? 
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During this period New Zealand was dealing with nations far larger than itself: a 
situation New Zealand finds at the present time (and no doubt will always be). 
Accordingly the findings remain relevant today. 
However, before it is possible to analyse the 1942-52 period, it is necessary to 
look at New Zealand's external relations prior to Japan's entry into the Second 
World War. 
In terms of external affairs, the years before 1942 can be divided into two parts. 
The first precedes the 1935 election of the first Labour Government, the second 
the years that followed. 
New Zealand External Relations Prior to 1935 
In actuality, the scope of New Zealand's external affairs up until the 1935 
election was very limited. In 1924 New Zealand had only one High 
Commissioner abroad, that being in London.1 New Zealand's external relations 
consisted of supporting British policies, control over the Pacific Islands of Niue, 
Tokelau, Western Samoa and the Cook Islands and trade with 'British' and 
minimally 'foreign' countries. 
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The first period is characterised by distinct lack of independence in the external 
affairs if New Zealand. The Massey Government (1912-25) in Wellington took 
the line that: 
... New Zealand was not competent to advise Britain on foreign affairs, 
and when consulted used in reply the predetermined form "New 
Zealand is content to be bound by the determination of His Majesty's 
Government in London."2 
New Zealand's trade relations with others were similarly very limited, although 
this would remain true throughout the period covered in this thesis. The vast 
majority of exports were to Great Britain and the Empire. These were also the 
major source of New Zealand's imported goods. 
1 According to the 1924 New Zealand Year Book, there were eight other Official New Zealand 
representatives abroad. Government Agents in Sydney, San Francisco and Vancouver, a 
customs representative in London and New York, a Trade Commissioner in Melbourne, an 
Honorary Tourist agent in Adelaide and a honorary New Zealand Representative in Calcutta. 
Destination of New Zealand Exports 1924-1952 
Country 1924 1930 1936 1942 1947 1952 
UK 79.93% 80.14% 80.16% 74.97% 76.66% 65.33% 
Australia 4.72 3.48 3.25 3.37 3.18 i.64 
Canada i.37 5.56 i.95 4.48 2.38 2.18 
Other British 1 .67 1 .78 .92 2.26 i.94 2.90 
Total British 87.69 90.96 86.28 85.08 84.16 72.05 
USA 6.24 4.71 5.07 7.43 6.35 11 .38 
Other 6.07 4.33 8.65 7.49 9.49 16.57 
Foreign 
Total 12.31 9.04 13.72 14.92 15.84 27.95 
Foreign 
Onq1n o ew eaan f N Z I d' s Imports 1924-1952 
Country 1924 1930 1936 1942 1947 1952 
UK 47.82% 47.58 49.37% 37.43 42.76% 54.91% 
Australia 11.64 6.81 11.16 15.12 11.61 10.62 
Canada 8.07 8.95 7.52 4.36 9.03 3.52 
Other British 6.30 5.05 4.69 11.16 9.89 7.10 
Total British 73.83 68.39 72.74 68.07 73.29 76.15 
USA 16.05 17.82 12.66 27.80 18.13 9.26 
Other 10.12 13.79 14.60 14.13 8.58 14.59 
Foreign 
Total 26.17 31.61 27.26 31.93 26.71 23.85 
Foreign 
The above export/import figures show the trade aspect of New Zealand's 
external affairs was clearly focused on the United Kingdom and other 'British" 
countries. New Zealand's trade with 'non-British' countries can best be 
described as marginal. 
2 BENNETT, B. New Zealand's Moral Foreign Policy 1935-1939: The Promotion of Collective 
Security Through the League of Nations, New Zealand Institute of International affairs, 
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They also show the degree of dependence that New Zealand had on the 
strength of the British economy. New Zealand's prosperity was tied inextricably 
with that of the United Kingdom. It was therefore in New Zealand's interest to 
support Britain as any deterioration in the relationship could have harmed the 
trade situation and in turn placed New Zealand's economic health in jeopardy. 
The status of New Zealand in the international arena during this period (i.e. 
prior to 1935 General election) is well illustrated by New Zealand's involvement 
at a conference held in Washington DC between 12 November 1921 and 6 
February 1922. 
The 1924 Official New Zealand Year-book contains a report by the Hon. Sir 
John Salmond3 describing this conference . It clearly shows the relationship 
between the Dominions (including New Zealand) and Great Britain at this time. 
It is to be noticed that the invitation of the American Government to 
attend a Conference in Washington on the limitation of armaments and 
on Pacific questions was an invitation to the Government of Great 
Britain and to the other seven Powers - namely, France, Italy, Japan, 
China, Belgium, Holland, and Portugal. There was no invitation to 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand or any other Dominion of the Crown.4 
Had New Zealand had an independent external relations policy, this would, or 
should, have been recognised by other nations. At the Washington conference 
Wellington. '1988. p.1 
3 Delegate for the Dominion of New Zealand at the conference. 
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Great Britain did invite a representative each from New Zealand, Australia, India 
and Canada; (it provided a delegate for South Africa) to be part of its delegation, 
however: 
The procedure of the Washington Conference was in itself a clear 
indication that the Dominions were not in their own right as quasi-
independent States, but merely as constituent portions of an undivided 
Empire. When any question came to be voted on ... the question was put 
to the British Delegation as a whole, and was answered "Yes" or "No" 
by Mr. Balfour as head and spokesman of that Delegation, and on 
behalf of the British Empire as a whole ... The final decision in every 
case was that the of the British Empire as an indivisible unity. 5 
The view that New Zealand was 'British" rather than an independent nation 
continued with New Zealand's next Prime Minister, George Forbes. On February 
19 1935 he delivered a speech on the international situation to the House of 
Representatives which shows the Government still clearly identified with British 
policies. It also explains the rationale for such a close association: 
My final comment is addressed directly to the people of this country. 
The British Dominions are not parties to this proposed [Kellog] pact just 
as they were not parties to the Treaty of Locarno, but lf arrangement 
comes into force, and if ever the nations that are parties to the 
arrangement are required to apply the proposed guarantees, then there 
must be no blinking the fact that if Britain become involved in a war New 
Zealand would be involved. This is so because of the legal position as 
we accept in New Zealand (though there is some difference of opinion 
on this matter in certain other Dominions), it is so because the 
4 SALMOND, J., Relationship of Dominions to Great Britain, in The New Zealand Year Book: 
1924, Government Printer, Wellington. 1923. p.699 
5 ibid. 
sentiment of this country would inevitably insist on New Zealand 
standing shoulder to shoulder with Great Britain in such circumstances; 
and, even were these two reasons absent, any catastrophe that affects 
Great Britain must inevitably affect New Zealand also, bound up as are 
in the welfare of the Old Country.6 
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Forbes in this statement reinforced the notion that British foreign policy was, by 
default, New Zealand's. A country half way around the world in the South Pacific 
saw itself as an unofficial member of an European security pact. The reasons for 
this were given as the historical and cultural links to Britain, the economic 
dependence of New Zealand on the United Kingdom and the legal status of New 
Zealand in international relations. 
The 'legal' position Forbes was referring to became known as the Westminster 
Act. The political status of New Zealand as a Dominion was set in 1926, 
however the legal form did not match this. The Westminster Act sought to bring 
the political and legal status of the Dominion into line and permit New Zealand to 
act independently of the United Kingdom. The Act could have been passed in 
New Zealand in early 1931, yet it was not. The government felt comfortable at 
the time with the situation and saw no reason to pass the Act into law. 
However, by not adopting the Statute of Westminster, doubts were raised over 
the ability of the New Zealand Government to legally take external relations 
6 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, (hereafter NZPD), 19 February 1935: volume 241. pp.82-
83 
decisions independently from the United Kingdom. This reinforces the notion 
that New Zealand was not independent in its external affairs. 
New Zealand's External Affairs 1935-1945 
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With the 1935 General election and the coming to power of the first Labour 
Government, New Zealand moved towards a more independent stance in its 
external affairs. This resulted from two major differences the new government 
had with the outgoing. These were related to the interpretation of the legal status 
of New Zealand and the considerable ideological difference between the 
governments in Wellington and London. 
The Labour Government did not embrace the Westminster Act, but 
nonetheless considered that the political status of New Zealand allowed it to act 
independently. They firmly held the view that as New Zealand had a place at the 
League of Nations and had the right to use that position in a way that served its 
own interests. 
Further, the incoming Labour Government was socialist in nature and held 
views that were in stark contrast to the conservative government in London. This 
was perhaps most clearly illustrated by New Zealand's approach to the League 
of Nations. 
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Labour had always been a strong supporter of the League of Nations. While in 
opposition it believed the League "could banish war and create a more just 
world,"7 ideals which fitted nicely in with its socialist ideological platform. 
In a speech reported by The New Zealand Worker at the King's Theatre on 16 
September 1935, Walter Nash8 said in a campaign meeting that: 
The Labour Party is solidly behind the idea of collective security. This 
can be best achieved through adherence to the Covenant of the League 
of Nations9 
The report went on to state: 
In conclusion, Mr. Nash said the Labour Party was working towards 
rational and reasonable agreement between nations. New Zealand was 
a nation and had signed the Covenant as such. New Zealand belonged 
to the British Commonwealth of Nations, but was a unit in it and not a 
satellite behind any other unit in it. The Labour Party in New Zealand 
would do all that it could to uphold the Convenant of the League of 
Nations.10 
The Labour Party clearly intended to take a more independent line in external 
affairs as borne out with the crises in Abyssinia and Spain prior to the outbreak of 
the Second World War. 
7 MCKINNON, M. Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935, 
Auckland University Press, Auckland. 1993. p.14 
8 Senior opposition Labour MP 
9 NASH, W. in The New Zealand Worker, in MCINTYRE, W. & GARDNER, W. (eds.) Speeches 
and Documents on New Zealand History, Oxford University Press, Wellington. 1971. p.359 
10 ibid 
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The Italian invasion of Abyssinia led to the 'Hoare-Laval' proposal. This was an 
attempt by the United Kingdom and France to end the conflict by ceding half of 
Abyssinia to Italy. New Zealand would not support this proposal and indicated 
this to London five days after the proposal was put forward. New Zealand was 
concerned that if Abyssinia, a small nation (like itself), could be treated in such a 
way, i.e. a large state invading a small state and effectively getting away with it, it 
would greatly lessen the ability of the League to stop aggression in other cases. 
This was far removed from the attitude of the Massey government; New 
Zealand was now prepared to disagree publicly with the 'Mother Country.' The 
New Zealand decision to support the League and its call of sanctions (short of 
war) against Italy was later adopted by Britain and France. It seems, that 
massive public opinion against the proposals in those countries forced the 
abandonment of the Hoare-Laval plan rather than New Zealand's opposition. 
The Civil War in Spain also highlighted differences between New Zealand and 
United Kingdom. New Zealand felt that the overthrow of a Government, that 
broadly supported the same ideals as itself, by a fascist rebellion supported by 
Germany and Italy was a matter the League should be involved in, whereas the 
British Government felt it was a domestic issue for the Spanish to sort out. The 
British were also concerned with repairing relations with Italy (who were 
supporting the fascists) after the affair, but this was of less importance for New 
Zealand. 
William Jordan speaking at the League of Nations Council on 28 May 1937 
stated: 
I am sure that we all feel the responsibility of the position in which we 
find ourselves at this table of the Council of the League of Nations. We 
have a definite pledge with a purpose. The eyes of the world are on the 
Council at this time. Whatever the matter in dispute may be, whatever 
the cause of the conflict, the people of the world are shocked at the 
dreadful happening in Spain, and the situation at the present time surely 
calls for some action . 
. . . As it is a function of the League to safeguard the lives of people, to 
maintain peace, and to uphold lawful and constitutional Governments 
against invasion and the violence of outside powers, it is undoubtedly 
time that some decision in the Spanish situation was taken if the 
League is going to act at all in this matter. .. 11 
Again New Zealand was prepared to voice its own opinion on the world stage 
even though this meant taking a different position to that of the United Kingdom. 
New Zealand had also broadened its external affairs 'horizons' from simply 
following the line set in London; a trend that continued in September 1939 with 
the start of the Second World 
11 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, '1937-8 A-5b pp32-3 
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New Zealand's conduct during the Second World War differed significantly 
from that of the First World War (1914-18). Of prime importance, New Zealand 
independently declared war on Germany informing the United Kingdom that: 
His Majesty's Government in New Zealand desire immediately to 
associate themselves with His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom ... The existence of a state of war with Germany has 
accordingly been proclaimed in New Zealand ... 12 
On 5 September 1939, the Prime Minister spoke to New Zealand on radio 
announcing that New Zealand was at war: 
I am satisfied that nowhere will the issue [the destruction of Nazism] be 
more clearly understood than in New Zealand - where for almost a 
century, behind the sure shield of Britain, we have enjoyed and 
cherished freedom and self-government. Both with gratitude for the 
past, and with confidence in the future, we range ourselves without fear 
beside Britain. Where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand. 
We are only small and young nation, but we are one and all a band of 
brothers, and we march forward with a union of hearts and wills to a 
common destiny.13 
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Although aligning very much with the United Kingdom in declaring war against 
Germany, New Zealand it did so of its own choice, although not surprisingly, the 
decision-makers in both London and Wellington had the same view with regard 
to the action to be taken. 
12 GOVERNOR GENERAL OF NEW ZEALAND to SECRET ARY OF ST ATE FOR DOMINION 
AFFAIRS, telegram: 4 September 1939, in DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, Documents 
Relating to New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War: i 939-45: volume one, 
(hereafter Documents: volume one), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. i 949. p.6 
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In sending its forces overseas on this occasion New Zealand, for the most part, 
kept tighter control over its forces than it had done previously in either the Boer 
War (1899-1901) or the First World War (1914-1918). Specifically the 
Commanding Officer of the 2nd NZ Division, General Freyberg, was given the 
following instructions on 5 January 1940 with respect to the employment of the 
2nd New Zealand Division: 
The General Officer Commanding will act in accordance with the 
instructions he receives from the Commander-in-Chief under whose 
command he is serving, subject only to the requirements of His 
Majesty's Government in New Zealand.14 
As a single entity the 2nd New Zealand Division was the most visible part of 
New Zealand's war effort, embodying much of the New Zealand concern and 
determination. Accordingly, the New Zealand Government was anxious to see it 
was used, and supported, properly. Members of the Government were also well 
aware of the horrendous losses New Zealand forces had experienced in the First 
World War and did not want this repeated. The New Zealand Division was 
effectively New Zealand's national army, unlike the other Allied wartime divisions, 
which were for the most part, simply elements of a larger national force. If the 2nd 
NZ Division was not in theatre, New Zealand was not in theatre, if the division 
suffered horrendous losses, the whole of New Zealand suffered accordingly. The 
majority of New Zealand's eggs were in this basket. 
13 SAVAGE, M. Broadcast to the Nation: 5 September 1939, in Documents: volume one. p.1 
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This desire to keep control over a large proportion of its forces 15 again 
illustrates that New Zealand was not content to accept British policy 
unconditionally. It wanted to decide for itself the role that the New Zealand forces 
would play. 
Theoretical approach 
As a small state, New Zealand had to (and still does) decide how it could best 
exert influence over larger states. 
David Vital argued in 'The Inequality of States,' that there are three possible 
strategies that a small state can pursue in its external affairs policies: the 
passive, active and defensive. In summary, these are 
Passive. The struggle to maintain freedom of choice in the external 
world is explicitly or implicitly renounced ... It implies acquiescence in 
the fact (or belief) that the state is not viable as an independent 
international entity. 
Active. [l]s designed to alter the external environment of the state to its 
advantage either by 
a) reducing the discrepancy in strength between the state and the 
external forces that matter; or by 
14 FRASER, P. to FREYBERG, B., telegram: 5 January 1940, in Documents: volume one. p.2 
15 However, New Zealand Naval and air contributions in Europe remained under British control. 
b) widening the limits of freedom of political choice and manoeuvre; 
or else by 
c) increasing the total resources of the state, and therefore 
strengthening the safe base by external increment. 
Scope for adoption and execution of such a strategy is clearly small 
Defensive. [Is] designed, in essence, to preserve the status quo, 
relying on strength through internal increment.16 
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This thesis will argue that New Zealand followed an active strategy throughout 
the 1942-52 period. It was not prepared to be " ... a mere pawn in the game of the 
great ones," and hence acted accordingly. Applying this theory to the security 
aspect of New Zealand's external relation policy, this thesis will examine the 
following hypotheses: 
H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when 
deciding its external affairs policy. 
H2 That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not 
another country. 
H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relation 
goals. 
16 ibid. p.121 
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Structure 
This thesis is divided into four parts. (i)The above introduction, which included 
a brief overview of New Zealand's external affairs policy during the period 1918-
1942, (ii and iii) two case studies of specific importance to New Zealand's 
security covering the 1942-52 period and (iv) a conclusion. The introduction has 
introduced the topic of the thesis and has also provided an overview of New 
Zealand's external affairs policy during the period of study to provide some 
background to the case studies. It also outlined the hypotheses of this thesis and 
the manner they will be examined. The next two chapters are the case studies, 
which will be examined with reference with the stated hypotheses. The fourth 
and final chapter embraces the conclusion. 
This conclusion will: 
• Summarise the information gathered for this thesis. 
• Compare the hypotheses to the results of the research 
• Compare the foreign policy path taken by New Zealand in the three case 
studies with the policy options suggested by Vital. 
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Chapter Two: 
The Pacific War & the Surrender and Occupation of Japan 
Introduction 
This chapter examines New Zealand's participation in the Pacific War, and 
specifically the employment of ground forces and to a lesser degree naval and air 
forces, the surrender and occupation of Japan at the end of the Second World 
War and, in particular, the degree of independence shown by New Zealand 
during this period. New Zealand's experience at this time is a useful example of 
the problems small states can have in achieving external affairs goals when 
dealing with much larger nations. 
The first part of the chapter will look into the decision not to deploy the 2nd NZ 
Division in the Pacific theatre from the Middle East despite the threat posed to 
New Zealand. The second part will address the difficulties both New Zealand 
and Australia experienced to become signatories to the surrender on 2 
September 1945. The third will discuss New Zealand's involvement in both the 
Far Eastern Commission and the occupation of Japan. The fourth and final part 
of this chapter will evaluate the success of New Zealand's approach and its 
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policies and compare these with Vital's 'small state policy directions,' as stated in 
his book 'The Inequality of Small States.' 
This chapter will show that New Zealand acted throughout this period as an 
independent nation and did not simply 'follow the Mother country' in policy. 
Evidence from the relative government documents, covering New Zealand's 
attitude toward the Pacific War and the surrender and occupation of Japan 
clearly demonstrate this. 
The Japanese attack on the United States naval base of Pearl Harbour on 7 
December signalled the beginning of the Pacific phase of the Second World War. 
As with the outbreak of the war with Germany, New Zealand independently 
declared war on Japan, informing the United Kingdom of the decision on 9 
December 1941 . 
The war in the Pacific started disastrously for the allies. As well as the 
decimation of the United States Navy at Pearl Harbour, the Royal Navy lost both 
the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse on 1 O 
December. This was followed by a rapid advance of Japanese forces down the 
Malayan Peninsula and the loss of Singapore on 15 February 1942. The 
Philippines fell three months later in May 1942. 
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The Imperial defence system upon which New Zealand had hitherto relied had 
clearly failed to prevent Japan entering the war against the allies, and as their 
advance continued the deficiencies of the system became even more apparent. 
Indeed, doubts rapidly surfaced as to whether the Imperial system could work at 
all. The United Kingdom, upon whom the whole system was based, seemed 
very much committed in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe with little spare 
capacity for operations further afield. The New Zealand Herald recognised this 
on 29 January 1942, as noted by F Wood: 
... the New Zealand Herald commented bitterly on Churchill's statement 
that 'while facing Germany and Italy we never had sufficient arms to 
provide effectively for the defence of the Far East.' Why, then, asked 
the Herald, had the countries now menaced by Japan not been told of 
this and why had India, Australia and New Zealand been "allowed to 
continue the despatch of fighting-men to the Middle East and to 
Britain?'17 
Although understandable in the context of the time, the comment is, on 
reflection, a little harsh. It is true the Imperial system had to some extent failed, 
but it then it had never visualised the need to fight a truly 'world war.' Further, 
although alarmed at the Japanese advance in the Pacific, the United Kingdom 
was concerned with the farmer's advance on India. They did not believe that 
New Zealand and Australia were directly threatened by invasion, and if that 
became a possibility, the United Kingdom was prepared to enter the Pacific war 
17 WOOD, F., The New Zealand People at War: Political and External Affairs, Department of 
Internal Affairs, Wellington. 1958. p.209 
in a much larger capacity. The United Kingdom's wartime Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill wrote: 
It was however always understood that if Japan invaded Australia or 
New Zealand the Middle East should be sacrificed to the defence of our 
own kith and kin. This contingency we all regarded as remote and 
improbable because of the vast abundance of easier and more 
attractive conquests offered to Japan by Malaya, Siam and above all 
the Dutch East lndies.18 
With Japan's entry into the war and its rapid advance southwards, a direct 
threat to both Australia and New Zealand was considered likely by both 
countries. Accordingly, the Australians recalled their 9th Division to fight to their 
north in the Western Pacific. New Zealand harboured similar thoughts. New 
Zealand's Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs Peter Fraser sent a 
telegram to Prime Minister Churchill on 19 November 1942: 
I feel that the time has come when I must raise with you the question of 
the return from the Middle East of the 2nd New Zealand Division. In 
doing so I assure you that I am fully aware of the exigencies of the war 
situation both in this part of the world and in the North African theatre ... 
... Here in the Pacific ... we are faced ... with the possibility that Japan 
may launch offensive action ... It is felt that the place of the 2nd New 
Zealand division ... is here in the South Pacific.19 
Churchill replied that: 
18 CHURCHILL, W. The Second World War: volume Three: The Grand Alliance, Cassell & Co. 
Ltd. London. 1950. p.523 
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It would cause me much regret to see the New Zealand Division quit the 
scene of Its glories. But I quite understand your feelings.2° 
27 
However, it was made clear (by sending a copy of a telegram Churchill had 
sent to the Australian Prime Minister) that the logistics of transporting the 2nd NZ 
Div. to the Pacific and getting it ready for action in that theatre would cause major 
disruption to allied operations. 
It was also pointed out that the removal of the New Zealand division would 
require replacement with an American or British equivalent after a further one 
had been found for the 9th Australian. 
Neither did the United States of America want the New Zealand forces moved 
home. Brigadier Williams21 stated that: 
The United States Chiefs of Staff spoke bluntly against the move. 
Marshall [Chief of Staff, US Army] stated that he was fully convinced 
that the defence of Australia and New Zealand would be weakened by 
the return of these divisions at this stage. The Combined Staffs were 
now hard put to find ships for movements already approved. Lack of 
ships was preventing the reinforcement of Burma and the Far East, 
where operations under consideration would put troops in contact with 
the enemy. This would have important repercussions on the defence of 
Australia and New Zealand. He appreciated the points advanced but 
19 FRASER, P. to CHURCHILL, W., telegram: 19 November 1942, in Documents two, p.142 
2° CHURCHILL, W., to FRASER, P., telegram: 24 November 1942, in Documents: volume two, 
r-145 
1 New Zealand Army representative on the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington, February 
1942-0cober 1943 
expressed grave concern regarding military implications which impeded 
the war effort as a whole. 22 
In the end, New Zealand elected to keep the Division in the African and 
European theatres, and although this coincided with British (and American) 
hopes, it was by no means a rubber stamp exercise. A secret session of the 
House of Representatives on 3 December 1942 debated this issue at length 
before deciding not to relocate the 2nd NZ Division. Accordingly, Fraser sent a 
telegram to Churchill on 4 December saying: 
The facts set out in your telegram under reply and the dangers involved 
in attempting in the present circumstances to move the 2nd New 
Zealand Division have greatly impressed us, and we have come to the 
conclusion - unanimously shared by all my colleagues and by all the 
members of the House of Representatives - that we cannot take the 
responsibility, in the circumstances that you outline, of pressing for the 
return of the New Zealand troops at this juncture.23 
28 
While it might be argued that New Zealand simply bowed to its larger allies, it is 
perhaps much fairer to acknowledge the decision to leave the 2nd Division in situ 
was a pragmatic one taken by Wellington, especially given the circumstances at 
the time. Had New Zealand insisted on following Australia's lead then 
undoubtedly it could have done so, but the reasons against were plainly stated, 
and in turn accepted by the government of the day in Wellington. The commonly 
held view that Britain 'forced' New Zealand to stay and fight in North Africa and 
22 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., telegram: 5 December 1942, in Documents: volume two, 
p.i49 
29 
the Mediterranean has no foundation. It was quite reasonable for both the United 
Kingdom and the United States to provide their perceptions and views, but to 
suggest this constituted coercion or force is clearly unreasonable. 
Despite the United Kingdom's confidence in New Zealand's security, New 
Zealand was facing the prospect, for the first time since the Russian scare of the 
1880's, of fighting close in its own region rather than far away in Europe or 
Africa.24 
However, notwithstanding the decision to refain the Division in Africa, New 
Zealand did participate in the Pacrfic War under United States command. The 
Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) was heavily involved in the Pacific 
theatre having thirteen squadrons in action against Japanese forces and a total 
of seven thousand personnel in theatre by wars end.25 They were heavily 
involved in the Guadalcanal, Solomon Island, Rabaul and Bougainville 
operations with the last combat operation taking place on 3 August 1945. There 
was also a Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) presence in the region. The 
Leander class cruisers HMNZS Achilles and HMNZS Leanderwere involved in 
escort duties in support of the allied Pacific effort as well as operations at 
Guadalcanal and the Solomons. Later the Achilles would join the Fiji class 
cruiser HMNZS Gambia in the British Fleet in operations against the Japanese 
23 FRASER, P to CHURCHILL, W., telegram: 4 December 1942, in Documents: volume two, 
p.148 
home islands. For a short time, a two brigade second army division, the 3rd NZ 
Division26 was raised and saw action in the Solomons and the Green Islands. 
Although not necessary identified at the time, the commitment of these forces 
to fight alongside the United States of America, who clearly bore the burden of 
the responsibility for the Pacific, marked a significant change in New Zealand's 
defence relationships. Identification was much later in coming 
The Japanese Surrender 
30 
With the war drawing to an end after four years of bitter fighting, New Zealand 
and Australia were now worried that despite playing a part in the defeat of Japan, 
they were not to be included in the negotiations to end the war. 
This concern was justified as neither country was invited to the conferences 
held to formulate the defeat, and ultimately the surrender terms, of Germany and 
Japan. The Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943) and the Potsdam Conference 
(July-August 1945) were the domain of the major powers: the United States, 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China (in Cairo). 
24 There had been the appearance of the odd German raider in the South Pactfic as well as the 
occupation of Samoa during the First World War, these were however, minor compared to the 
huge size of the two world wars. 
25 WRIGHT, M. Kiwi Air Power: The History of the RNZAF, Reed, Auckland. 1998. p.81 
26 3NZ Div. was formed May 1943, however the strain on New Zealand's resources of supporting 
two full Divisions was beyond it. 
With this increasingly frustrating situation, the Australian External Affairs 
Minister Dr. Evatt27 suggested in the Australian House Representatives that an 
international conference be held to consider the problems of defence, post war 
development in the South West and South Pacrric.28 Other issues to be 
discussed included 'native' welfare, economics and trade, air routes and 
communications. The New Zealand High Commissioner in Australia, Carl 
Berendsen reported to Fraser on 21 October 1943 that Evatt: 
... wishes to hold this conference (probably in Australia) if possible 
before Christmas. He attaches the utmost importance to this subject 
and considers Australia and New Zealand in co-operation should be the 
foundation of the British sphere of influence in the South-West and the 
South Pacific and that the future safety and prosperity of these two 
Dominions depend on their having a decisive voice in these areas. He 
would favour preliminary discussion between Australia and New 
Zealand only, which he would like to see take place as soon as this 
could be conveniently arranged ... He thinks it desirable (?and) essential 
that Australia and New Zealand should be in a position to play a 
predominant part in future of these areas and he considers these two 
Dominions particularly qualified to do so by their special knowledge and 
experience. He feels that the joint Australian and New Zealand policy 
on this matter might well be expected to prevail.29 
27 Australian Minister for External Affairs 
31 
28 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., telegram: 21 October 1943, in KAY, R. (ed.) Documents on 
New Zealand External Relations: volume one: The Australian New Zealand Agreement 1944, 
(hereafter KAY(ed.) volume one), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. 1972. p.47 
29 ibid 
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Australia was hoping that by putting forward a united front, both itself and New 
Zealand would be in a better position to exert influence over the future direction 
of the region. 
Wellington agreed and replied on 30 October that New Zealand would welcome 
the opportunity to take part in preliminary discussions with Australia. This was 
approved by Cabinet on 26 November and after negotiations, the date of the 
Australian -New Zealand talks was set to commence on 17 January 1944. 
When the New Zealand delegation arrived in Australia, they were given a 
series of prepared papers by the Australians on the issues to be discussed. The 
delegation reported that New Zealand was in agreement with 75 percent of the 
items on the agenda and hence there was no need for discussions on these in 
detail.30 New Zealand to its surprise found that Australia wanted a formal 
agreement at the end of the talks. As the delegation reported afterwards: 
Until we arrived at the Conference and in fact not until some time after 
proceedings had commenced was it known that the Australians were 
anxious for the Conference to be concluded by the making of a formal 
Agreement. All we had in mind up until then was a straightforward talk 
on the matters comprising the agenda and an understanding of the 
attitude to be adopted by both countries on subjects of the moment to 
us and in which we were jointly concerned. We had the idea that this 
could be met merely by a formal acceptance of the record of the 
proceedings. Mr. Curtin31 and his Ministers, however, at first soughtthe 
30 Report of the New Zealand Delegation on the Australian-New Zealand Conference, January 
1944, in KAY(ed.) volume one, p.67 
31 PM of Australia 
completion of a solemn Treaty or Pact. This was objected to first on the 
grounds of our inability to negotiate such a document and secondly on 
the grounds that it might create considerable misunderstanding. Finally 
the Prime Minister agreed to sign an Agreement setting out the 
objectives of the Dominion and the Commonwealth on questions on 
which we had a single mind and recording the means which we 
proposed to adopt for future collaboration and co-operation.32 
33 
In the Canberra Pact, as it became known, New Zealand and Australia agreed 
to closely consult each other on issues to do with external affairs and where 
possible to ensure they presented to the outside world a united stance on 
matters that concerned them. There was strong emphasis on both countries 
being given the respect and influence in relation to issues in the south-west and 
South Pacific from the larger powers, (primarily the United States and the United 
Kingdom). As well as security, defence, the shape of the post war world and 
relations with other nations, a united stance on issues such as civil aviation, 
migration, dependencies and territories, welfare and advancement of the 'native' 
peoples of the Pacific were negotiated. There was also a call for an international 
Conference relating to the South West and south Pacific. 
New Zealand and Australia certainly wtth this agreement stated publicly that 
they saw themselves as participants in the South-West and South Pacific and if 
any decisions were to be made concerning this area, they had a right to be 
involved and have their views taken into account. However, the Agreement 
worked out by Canberra was effectively just a joint policy statement by Australia 
32 ibid. p.67 
34 
and New Zealand coupled with an understanding that the two countries should 
I 
work closely together when formulating any future policies. The Agreement was 
not a major milestone in the development of New Zealand's external affairs policy 
as it simply was a continuation of the desire to be seen on the world stage as an 
independent nation. 
The Agreement failed in its objective to gain an 'ANZAC' voice in Pacific affairs, 
and as New Zealand initially worried, did cause considerable misunderstanding 
with both the United Kingdom and the United States. 
London was worried that the two Dominions were embarking on a new policy 
path without even informing the United Kingdom. Indeed one British Official33 
referred to it as the 'Anzaxis' pact34 forcing New Zealand to reassure London that 
it was not being excluded from Wellington's future plans.' 
The United States was concerned at Clause sixteen of the Agreement which 
suggested that foreign powers (i.e. the United States) did not have the rights of 
sovereignty over land used for military installations during the war after the 
conclusion of hostilities. Fraser again had to explain, this time to Washington, 
that the United States was indeed welcome in the region and New Zealand and 
Australia were not seeking their withdrawal from the South West and South 
Pacific. 
33 
Richard Sedwick, Official Secretary, British High Commission, Wellington 
35 
Notwithstanding, New Zealand, which viewed itself as an independent country 
that had declared war on Japan, and for that matter Germany, expected to be 
included in the closing formalities. Not only had it contributed a sizeable force 
against Japan already committed to supporting a large military presence in North 
Africa and Italy, but also it had supplied at considerable effort food for both Great 
Britain and the United States forces in the prosecution of the war. Additionally, 
after the defeat of Germany New Zealand was prepared to offer the 2nd New 
Zealand Division, the RNZAF (which would have been significantly larger in both 
terms of squadrons in theatre and personnel as a result of the influx of aircraft 
and New Zealand crews from the RAF) and the ships RNZN fighting with the RN 
in the Pacific, over fifty thousand men from all three services to Operation Cornet 
- the invasion of mainland Japan.35 With all this, it deserved to be heard. 
As indicated earlier, New Zealand's involvement in the Pacific differed from its 
other military deployments in the sense that the United States rather than the 
United Kingdom was the major ally. There is a certain amount of irony in this. 
New Zealand had been willing so often in its past to fight for the United Kingdom, 
a great power, yet when it appeared that New Zealand was threatened, the 
United Kingdom was simply not 'great' enough to send any meaningful force. It 
had been left to the United States to stop the Japanese. The 'sun was setting on 
the Empire.' 
34 MCINTOSH, A. to BEREN OSEN, C., letter: 3 February 1944, in MCGIBBON, I. Undiplomatic 
Dialogue. p.61 
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Irrespective of the practicalities of the situation, the readiness of New Zealand 
to 'leave the nest' so to speak and fight without the United Kingdom is worthy of 
record. While New Zealand realised that it was in its best interest to leave the 2nd 
NZ Division in the Middle Eastern theatre, it was not prepared to leave the Pacific 
fighting entirely to others. New Zealand would do its share, even if that meant 
fighting without Britain for the first time. Yet it seemed its contribution did not 
automatically confer a seat at the conference table. 
On the 27 July 1945, Evatt wrote to his New Zealand counterpart Fraser in 
Wellington, in relation to the Postdam conference: 
In respect of certain matters discussed at Potsdam including the 
proposed Council of Foreign Ministers, disposition of ex-enemy 
territories, disposal of German navy and merchant marine, and 
treatment of Italy, it is of vital importance to repeat that from Australia's 
point of view having regard to our total war effort and heavy sacrifices in 
European and Pacific theatres of war we should not either directly or 
indirectly be deprived of full right of participation as principals in framing 
the terms of peace in relation to our European and East Asian enemies. 
United Kingdom Government has frequently recognised that Australia 
and other Dominions fully possess this right. But right is valueless 
unless it can be effectively exercised and this requires full opportunities 
as principles to press [present?] views concerning peace arrangements 
in Europe and armistice and peace arrangements in Pacific and to do 
so face to face with all concerned in decisions at sufficiently early stage 
to give chance of such views proving effective 
35 Documents: volume three 
.... 3. As recently as Commonwealth meeting in London we sought and 
received undertakings that the Dominions would participate as 
principals in peace conference [which] would be held. We also received 
undertaking from Mr Churchill that Australia and New Zealand would 
participate in all matters relating to conclusion of armistices in Far East 
and participate also as principals .. 36 
The telegram went on to state what Churchill's undertakings were: 
"Mr Churchill said that he wholly sympathised and that he thought 
President [Roosevelt]37 was always extremely fair and would agree. He 
did not think that President would tolerate exclusion of Australia and 
New Zealand from conclusion of armistices in Far East. They should 
certainly participate ... Mr Fraser and Dr Evatt could rest assured that he 
would support Australia's and New Zealand's claims with all influence 
that he could use.38 
37 
Evatt sent another telegram to New Zealand the next day further expressing his 
view that it was vital for Australia and New Zealand to be included in the peace 
settlement: 
... there are some people who do not realise that the post-war security 
of the peoples of Australia and New Zealand, and of India too, are 
integrally bound up with the destiny of South-East Asia and are 
therefore directly dependant upon terms of the peace settlement with 
Japan."39 
36 EVATT, H. to FRASER., telegram: 27 July 1945, in KAY, R. (ed.), Documents on New Zealand 
External Relations: volume two: The Surrender and Occupation of Japan, (hereafter KAY (ed.) 
volume two), Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington. pp.18-19 
37 Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, three days after this discussion. 
38 EVATT, H. to FRASER, P., telegram: 27 July 1945, in Documents two, p.20 
39 EVATT, H. to FRASER, P. telegram: 30 August 1945, ibid. p.24 
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Australia was clearly concerned at being left out of any negotiations. It had 
pulled back a large majority of its forces from the Middle East to fight the 
Japanese, had sustained considerable casualties in the fighting, and had 
suffered from considerable Japanese air attacks, particularly on Darwin. They felt 
their security had been threatened and they did not want their concerns about the 
future being ignored. 
These views were mirrored in New Zealand. One week after receiving the 
Australian messages, Fraser, wrote to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
in the United Kingdom: 
... I feel that I should record at this stage however the fact that I share 
Dr Evatt's regret that the Potsdam communique to Japan was issued 
without previous consultation with Australia and New Zealand who have 
actively participated in the war in the Far East and who are so vitally 
interested in the nature of the peace settlement with Japan.40 
New Zealand also sent a telegram to Australia on the 4 August 1945 agreeing 
with their telegram of 27 July. Clearly neither country was prepared to just 'go 
along' with the major powers. They (Australia and New Zealand) had entered the 
war as independent countries, had been directly threatened by Japan, had fully 
participated in the war and both felt they had 'earned' the right to participate in 
the surrender. 
4° FRASER, P. to ADDISON, telegram: 4August 1945 in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.27 
39 
On the 6 August i 945 the Japanese city of Hiroshima became victim of the first 
atomic bomb. Three days later a second devastated the city of Nagasaki. On i 2 
August the Japanese agreed to the declaration and on ; 4 August the allies 
accepted the Japanese position. The war had ended abruptly. 
On 8 August the United Kingdom solicited New Zealand's views on a peace 
treaty. However, after Nagasaki on the i 3 August, the United States had a 
change of heart and asked for a New Zealand representative to be present at the 
surrender of Japan. It appeared that New Zealand would indeed be represented 
in the peace negotiations and, along with Australia, its concerns were to be 
allayed. 
However, the initial fears of both New Zealand and Australia materialised two 
days later. On i 5 August the United Kingdom informed New Zealand the United 
States would not consult with anybody else on the text of the surrender 
document: 
... State Department said ... that the United States Government are not in 
a position to consult their allies about the Act of Surrender ... State 
Department explained the reason why the United States Government 
was unwilling to enter into formal consultations with United Kingdom 
Government was that they did not intend to invite comments of Soviet 
or Chinese governments.41 
41 ADDISON to FRASER, P. telegram: 14August 1945, ibid. p.62 
40 
Despite representations from the United Kingdom on New Zealand's behalf, the 
United States would not grant New Zealand, or the other Dominions, 
independent status at the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan: 
State Department have replied to our representations that whilst willing 
that Admiral Fraser should be accompanied by General Blarney 
[Commander in Chief, Australian military forces] and other Dominion 
officers concerned, United States Government do not (repeat not) see 
their way to granting them independent status.42 
Practically there was very little that either New Zealand or Australia could do. 
With size and might the United States could dictate what other countries, in 
particular smaller ones like New Zealand, could achieve. On 24 August 1945, 
Prime Minister Fraser lamented in the House of Representatives on the situation 
New Zealand was in: 
... Up to the present time the indications are that neither Australia nor 
New Zealand will be signatories to the terms of surrender by Japan. So 
far, it would seem that those who will sign are the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
China, and, I think, France, but I am not so sure about the latter 
country. Our information, so far, is that other countries will not sign. 
There is no reflection on Australia or on New Zealand in that, because 
both countries will be represented.43 
Fraser, in the same statement, refuted the incorrect suggestion (particularly 
made in some Australian newspapers and picked up by some members of the 
42 ADDISON to FRASER,P., telegram: 16 August 1945, ibid. p.77 
43 NZPD: volume 269, 24 August 1945. p.282 
opposition) that the United Kingdom had not pressed for New Zealand and 
Australia's inclusion: 
... I am concerned to see that, above everything, our unity with the 
United Kingdom should be maintained. That is the important matter-
unity with the United Kingdom; and I hope hat no member on either side 
of this House will say anything that will give even the semblance of 
divergence between this country and the United Kingdom in matters of 
foreign policy ... l hope the smaller will be taken more and more closer 
into closer equality with the larger nations, but the position, 
unfortunately, at San Francisco, and earlier at Teheran, at Yalta, and at 
Berlin is just the opposite. The great nations have the greatest power. 
We knew what power they did have, and, with the atomic bomb, that 
realization on our part is greater. They are predominant in the world at 
the present time. We have to realise that and make the best of it; the 
main thing is that Australia and New Zealand have been close together. 
We have taken up the same attitude. We have protested against any 
exclusion which does not give us equality in the Pacific. So long as this 
Government is in office, we are not going to quarrel with the Mother-
country, even if the Mother country cannot extend the equality she 
would like to extend to us.44 
41 
Fraser was reflecting on the dilemma New Zealand was in. Its 'champion,' the 
United Kingdom, was no longer the dominant figure in international affairs 
anymore: the United States now held that place. In the absence of a 
comparative relationship to that with the United Kingdom, New Zealand had little 
influence with the United States. There was some credit due through New 
Zealand's Pacific involvement, but this seemed insufficient, and along with 
Australia they were to be left out in the cold. The fledgling United Nations was 
not an effective body and help could not be expected from that direction. 
42 
Thus the dilemma of small states when dealing with larger ones. That is, larger 
states determine the degree of participation the smaller can play. In this case the 
United States decided it did not need to take other nations into account, 
especially a couple of small ones like Australia and New Zealand. 
As it was, the United States had altered its position. A press report emerged 
from the Philippine capital Manila, coincidentally on the same day as Fraser's 
statement, quoting Admiral Nimitz as saying that along with the United States, 
the United Kingdom, China and the Soviet Union, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Canada and New Zealand were to be the signatories to the surrender document. 
New Zealand was also going to be allowed to participate in the Far Eastern 
Commission (FEC). The pressure bought to bear by the United Kingdom and the 
protests from Australia and New Zealand on the United States had helped 
change its mind. There was also another factor that may have influenced the 
United States decision: the indication given by Australia and New Zealand that 
they were willing to contribute to the occupation of Japan after the surrender. 
The Far Eastern Commission 
43 
Between the 15 and 24 August 1945 New Zealand was informed it would be 
allowed to be present at the surrender, but would not be a signatory. During this 
period, New Zealand had decided to pursue the option of sending a military force 
to Japan as part of the occupation and on the 16 August instructed General 
Freyberg to prepare for such a possibility. 
Following the unconditional surrender of Japan on board the USS Missouri, the 
victorious allies had then to decide how to deal with their defeated enemy. New 
Zealand wanted to be part of the process that decided the post-war fate of 
Japan. Having confronted the possibility of invasion less than three years earlier 
New Zealand was obviously keen to prevent that from happening again. As has 
already been shown, Wellington saw itself as independent and therefore wanted 
its own voice in any settlement. 
As a participant in the war against Japan, New Zealand was asked by the 
United States on 8 October to be part of the Commission. New Zealand put 
forward Carl Berendsen as its representative. This was an obvious move as the 
FEC was to be based in Washington and as he was now New Zealand's Minister 
in the United States, Berendsen had extensive experience in dealing with 
Washington as well as being his country's pre-eminent diplomat. 
The Far Eastern Commission was established 
... for the consideration of political matters connected with the fulfilment 
by Japan with its obligations under the instrument of surrender.45 
44 
The functions of the FEC, as laid out in a communique made on 28 December 
1945 were as follows: 
II Functions 
A The functions of the Far Eastern Commission shall be: 
1. To formulate the polices, principles and the standards in conformity 
with which the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms 
of surrender may be accomplished. 
2. To review on the request of any member any directive issued to the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or any action taken by 
the Supreme Commander involving the policy decisions within the 
jurisdiction of the Commission. To consider such matters as may 
be assigned to it by agreement among the principal governments 
reached in accordance with the voting procedure in Article V-2 
hereunder. 
B The Commission shall not make recommendations with regard to the 
conduct of military operations nor with the regard to territorial 
adjustments. 
/II Functions of the United States Government 
1. The United States Government shall prepare directives in 
accordance with the policy decisions of the Commission and shall 
transmit them to the Supreme Commander through the appropriate 
United States Government agency. The Supreme Commander 
shall be charged with implementation of the directives which 
express the policy decisions of the Commission. 
V Composition 
2. The Commission may take action by less than unanimous vote 
provided that the action shall have the concurrence of at least a 
majority of all the representatives including the representatives of 
45 CHILDS, P. to FRASER, P. letter 8 October 1945 in KAY (ed.) volume two, p.216 
the four of the following powers: United States of America, United 
Kingdom, USSR and China.46 
45 
The members of the Commission at this stage were the USSR, United 
Kingdom, United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, 
India, the Philippines and New Zealand. The United States had realised that it 
alone could not expect to 'run the show' all by itself (as it had with the Japanese 
surrender) and would take into account the other allied powers. 
Yet in setting up the FEC the major powers severely handicapped the 
Commission, and in particular the role the smaller powers such as Australia and 
New Zealand could play. This was through the power of veto, which the United 
States, United Kingdom, the USSR and China had bestowed upon themselves. 
The consequences of this, particularly with the actions of the United States, 
would reveal themselves as time progressed. 
However, it would be fair to say that at this time this power was not a problem 
for New Zealand. The reason was that New Zealand did not actually have a 
policy to put forward! McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 1 O October 1945 saying 
that: 
It is regrettable that we have no policy or, for that matter, any definite 
views on the Japanese settlement, but the Prime Minister is firmly 
46 CRAN BOURNE to FRASER, P. Text of communique on Moscow meeting between US, UK & 
USSR 28 December, telegram :27 August 1945, in KAY(ed.)volume two, p.281-2 
convinced that our policy, such as it is, will be well-known to you 
consequently no definite instructions will be needed.47 
46 
The lack of a specific policy was quickly overcome in Wellington and the FEC 
undertook its first actions with a tour of war ravaged Japan where, on 29 January 
1946 they had the opportunity to have a lengthy discussion with the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers(SCAP), General MacArthur. Berendsen 
reported that MacArthur saw himself as the servant of the all the governments in 
the FEC and he would be willing to implement the policy directives given by FEC. 
However, he stressed that it was important that there be only one allied control 
mechanism, i.e. SCAP.48 The FEC accepted MacArthur at his word and did not 
seek to set up any parallel authorities in Japan. The result was SCAP had total 
control in and over Japan. Dominating personality aside, this lack of balance 
coupled with the fact that the FEC was based in Washington and not in Japan 
itself, placed the FEC at a distinct disadvantage when trying to have its policies 
implemented. If SCAP decided to follow a particular course, there was very little 
recourse for the FEC as there were no alternative mechanism through which it 
could act. 
The British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
47 MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C.LETTER: 10 October 1945, in MCGIBBON,! in 
Undiplomatic Dialouge, p.101 
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The second 'string to New Zealand's bow" was a commitment by New Zealand 
to participate in the military occupation of the newly defeated Japan. On the 16 
August, General Freyberg had been instructed to prepare a New Zealand force 
for such a deployment and on the 21 August, New Zealand agreed in principle to 
contributing to what would become known as the British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force (BCOF) 
The BCOF was to be made up of British, Australian, Indian and New Zealand 
forces (Canada had declined to participate) and it was to be based in the south-
western tip of the island of Honshu in southern Japan, with the New Zealand 
brigade being responsible for the Yamaguchi prefecture. No.14 Squadron 
RNZAF also deployed as part of a tactical air force for the BCOF although it was 
separate from the land force deployment. Laurie Brocklebank in his book 
Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation of Japan 1945-1948 stated 
there were three roles for the New Zealanders' to perform: 
The first role was .. .'[m]ilitary control of [a designated] area and 
demilitarisation and destruction of equipment, arms and other 
defences'. Second, MacArthur [Supreme Commander Allied Powers] 
wanted the British Commonwealth forces to promote democracy among 
the Japanese. Third, enhancing the prestige of the Commonwealth, 
particularly for Peter Fraser [New Zealand's Prime Minister].49 
48 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P. Report on the FEC: January 1946, in KAY(ed.) volume two, 
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On the 30 September 1945 (printed in The Dominion, 1 October) Prime 
Minister Peter Fraser stated that New Zealand was giving serious consideration 
to participating in a Commonwealth occupation force in Japan. In the rationale 
he gave for New Zealand being involved, he emphasised the country's link to the 
United Kingdom, as well as the need for New Zealand to 'play Its part': 
"I feel sure, "said Mr Fraser, "That the people of New Zealand will agree 
that the opportunity of proving our unity and solidarity with the Mother 
country, and of sharing in the responsibilities of the British 
Commonwealth in the Pacific, should be accepted by the provision of a 
brigade group as requested by the United Kingdom Government. 
.... Indeed Mr Attlee said in his original message, 'We trust that we may 
rely on your assistance and indeed we regard your assistance as 
indispensable." 
... "It will be generally agreed also that our only enemy in the Pacific is 
Japan and her surrender does not of itself ensure freedom from future 
Japanese aggression. To render this impossible It is necessary to 
disarm Japan, to dismantle her war industries and, as far as possible, to 
eradicate the spirit of Japanese militarism" . 
.. . "It is clearly our duty ... to undertake our share of the responsibility for 
the enforcement of the peace, to the achievement of which our war 
effort has made a notable contribution. If, moreover, the peace 
settlement with Japan should fail, New Zealand may well be one of the 
first countries to suffer."50 
Fraser, in the statement above, gave three reasons for New Zealand's 
involvement. The first was loyalty to the United Kingdom and the 
Commonwealth, the second, the disarming of Japan and the third the country's 
duty to enforce the peace and protect the security of the region. 
5° FRASER, P. statement, in KAY(ed.) volume two, pp.1287-1288 
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It is true New Zealand still viewed the United Kingdom with a great deal of 
affection and loyalty. For example, the Statute of Westminster51 had not yet been 
adopted by New Zealand despite the fact it had been available since 1931.52 
As Ann Trotter wrote in New Zealand and Japan 1945-1952: The Occupation 
and the Peace Treaty: 
Psychological attachments [to the United Kingdom] had been 
strengthened by victory and wartime sacrifice in spite of the fact of 
demonstrated British weakness in the Pacific.53 
Yet this loyalty is not the principal reason why New Zealand joined the BCOF. 
The issue of regional security dominated and despite the recent disappointment 
and failure over the United Kingdom policies in the Pacific the latter was still 
considered the main guarantor of New Zealand's interests. But this was 
tempered with the realisation that as the United Kingdom struggled with the 
aftermath of the war, Britain might not be totally enthusiastic about Pacific 
security. 
This was of concern to New Zealand and the BCOF was seen as a way of 
encouraging the United Kingdom to stay in the Pacific. New Zealand saw its 
51 The Statute of Westminster would have formalised New Zealand's independence from the 
United Kingdom. 
52 BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.8 
53 TROTTER,A. New Zealand and Japan: The Occupation and the Peace Treaty, Althone Press, 
London. 1990. pp.1-2 
participation in the BCOF as a way of keeping the Pacific, and hence New 
Zealand's, security to the forefront of the United Kingdom's thinking.54 
and that: 
The occupation forces offered by Britain are so small as to suggest that, 
tor a number of reasons, she is not willing to make heavy commitments 
tor Far Eastern and Pacific security; this present indication is a 
significant indication of future policy.55 
" ... Britain needed reassurance and support if it was to remain 
committed to a role in the Pacific"56 
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By contributing milltary forces to the BCOF, New Zealand was hoping to keep 
the United Kingdom in the Pacific region. It certainly could not expect Britain to 
contribute its stretched armed forces if New Zealand was not prepared to 
contribute as well. The contribution was also closely linked to New Zealand's 
desire for Commonwealth unity in foreign and defence affairs. It certainly could 
not justify this desire if it did not participate actively when an opportunity such as 
the BCOF came along. 
As well, there remained a very close association between the New Zealand 
and British military. It was not until the mid 1960's that the chiefs of all three New 
Zealand services, as well as the Chief of Defence Force were all New 
54 BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, pp.7-8 
55 CORNER, memorandum: 21 August 1945, in BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.8 
56 LISSINGTON, P. Allied Control of Japan, in BROCKLEBANK, p.8 
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Zealanders. Until then at least one had been on secondment from Great Britain. 
The United Kingdom was still viewed as New Zealand's natural defence partner. 
Despite the recent evidence that suggested quite the contrary, New Zealand still 
saw the United Kingdom as its best option for its security. The status of the RN 
as the second most powerful naval force in the world offered a feeling of security 
against the only possible threat, Japan, which had effectively no military 
capability left. 
As Ian MacGibbon stated: 
... participation in the Brttish Commonwealth security system was 'so 
fundamental a requirement' that comment was 'scarcely needed57 
A second reason given by Fraser was a strong desire to have a greater role in 
the final peace treaty with Japan. New Zealand was effectively being ignored by 
the United States and the United Kingdom was having very little success in 
pushing either New Zealand's or Australia's claims to be involved (it was having 
a hard enough time getting its own views listened to). Were New Zealand to 
contribute to the occupation, and be prepared to 'play its part,' there would be a 
greater chance it would have a say in the Japanese peace settlement. When 
Fraser said "It is our policy ... to undertake our share of the enforcement of the 
peace," he was simply continuing New Zealand's policy of 'independence' that 
had started with the election of his government in 1935. 
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New Zealand was not prepared to go along simply with what the great powers 
said, yet Fraser in particular realised that with independence came 
responsibilities. If New Zealand wanted to be treated as an independent country 
it had to be prepared to act like one. In this case, this required contributing to the 
occupation of Japan. 
Also linked to this desire for independence was the realisation that the United 
States of America was dominating the situation with Japan, but might not handle 
the situation adequately for New Zealand. Specifically, the United States would 
not be hard enough on the newly defeated Japanese.58 
If New Zealand wanted to avoid a 'soft' peace treaty being forced through by 
the United States it would need to be part of the peace negotiations. Berendsen 
said that if New Zealand wanted to have any say in the outcome of the Peace 
Treaty, it would be taken more seriously if they contributed to the occupation of 
Japan.59 
Thus to say that New Zealand's willingness to contribute to the BCOF was 
simply a result of desire to please the 'Mother Country' is wrong. The affection 
for the United Kingdom is clear in Fraser's statements and deployment of New 
57 MACGIBBON, I. The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957, in New Zealand in World Affairs: 
volume one, (hereafter NZWA), Price Milburn, Wellington.1977. p.147 
58 TOTTER, A., Personality in Foreign Policy: Sir Carl Berendsen in Washington, :volume 20, 
no.2 1986 in BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.13 
Zealand military personnel in the BCOF fitted in very well with this, but this 
affection was not the primary reason for the deployment. 
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Until the fall of Singapore and the virtual destruction of the British Far East 
Fleet, New Zealand had always fought along side the 'mother-country'. Fighting 
as part of a 'greater-Britain' force to secure the interests of the United Kingdom 
was, by default, in New Zealand's interests. An almost total economic 
dependence upon the United Kingdom by New Zealand, along with historical, 
cultural and emotional ties ensured New Zealand remained inseparable from her. 
But New Zealand was now looking after its own interests first. It was New 
Zealand, along with Australia that was threatened by Japan and these two would 
be once again threatened if Japan 'rose from the ashes.' Imperial defence had 
failed in preventing the outbreak of the war and only the United States stopped 
the Japanese advance just to the north of Australia. New Zealand and Australia 
wanted to be there at the peace negotiations, for if the great powers did not come 
up with a satisfactory solution it would be New Zealand and Australia who would 
suffer the consequences. 
Yet as previously stated, New Zealand still firmly believed the United Kingdom 
was still the best option for New Zealand's future security. There was no 
indications at this stage that the United States, the only other nation with the 
potential to hold this place, would provide an adequate alternative. By 
59 FRASER, P. to ADDISON, telegram: 30 September 1945, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.1288 
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encouraging the United Kingdom to maintain a presence in the Asia-Pacific, New 
Zealand was looking after its own interests and not those of the United Kingdom. 
Although New Zealand's involvement with the Commonwealth occupation force 
also continued the trend set with its participation in the Pacific war alongside 
Australian and United States forces, the decision to send forces to Japan was not 
an effort to try and convince the United States to provide a security guarantee for 
the Pacific. Brocklebank noted that New Zealand was not keen on any formal 
arrangement with the United States along the lines of a security pact and "that 
there is no evidence that agreement to participate in the occupation of Japan was 
motivated by a desire to obtain American security guarantees."60 
A further practical reason New Zealand was keen to have a continued strong 
United Kingdom presence in the region was, rightly, a feeling that the infant 
United Nations system being set up, (which New Zealand did strongly support) 
did not as yet provide an adequate assurance of security.61 
New Zealand was a strong supporter of the United Nations and its 
predecessor, the League of Nations, yet until the United Nations was in a 
position to offer a security: 
New Zealand continued to rely upon more limited security 
arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter, article 51 of 
60 
BROCKLEBANK, Jayforce, p.10 
which allowed members to enter ad hoc arrangements for collective 
security. In 1945 she looked to her traditional participation in British 
Commonwealth defence arrangements.62 
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Prior to the war Fraser and the Labour Government had been strong 
supporters of the League of Nations and the ideas of collective security, and this 
was to continue with the newly formed United Nations afterwards. The United 
Nations, however, was in no position to be a viable security guarantee. With the 
defeat of the Axis powers the Cold War emerged and impacted immediately in 
the United Nations. With the power of veto, the West and the Soviet Union 
effectively made the United Nations impotent as disagreements on issues 
governing security surfaced in the Security Council. As a result, New Zealand 
felt it would have to continue to rely on the old Imperial system. Because of this, 
it was vital for New Zealand to encourage the United Kingdom to participate fully 
in Imperial defence, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The main body of 2NZEF (Japan) arrived in Kure, Japan from Italy on 19 March 
1946. No.14 Squadron arrived in Kure from New Zealand four days later on the 
23 March. The New Zealand forces remained in theatre and part of the BCOF 
until 25 November 1948 when the rear parties of 2NZEF and No.14 Squadron left 
for home. 
61 MCGIBBON, I. NZWA, p.146 
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However, by only the 3 April 1946 problems between SCAP and the FEC were 
becoming apparent. The FEC was not getting the policy initiatives suggested by 
SCAP until they had already been implemented63 • The FEC was supposed to 
review any plan put forward by MacArthur, yet this was not happening. 
An example came to the fore later in the month when New Zealand became 
concerned that despite chronic food shortages among the allies SCAP was 
authorising food shipments to Japan. Berendsen writing to the Minister of 
External Relations about this issue said that: 
It would appear that there is sufficient food in Japan to feed the whole 
population ... A reliable authority recently returned from Japan, namely, 
Colonel Thorpe, who was the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Section 
of SCAP, told the members of Committee No.4 the other day that the 
Japanese were almost completely unaware of the existence of a 
general world food shortage, so that it appears that little attempt has 
been made by SCAP in the last three months to remedy what appeared 
to be an omission in SCAP's public information policy ... 64 
Berendsen also expressed misgivings about the profile the FEC was given in 
Japan. He was of the opinion the United States was deliberately undermining 
the FEC in the eyes of the Japanese: 
The difficulty is that any attempt by the Commission to assert its 
authority or even to exercise its proper functions tends to be played up 
in the local press as an attack on General MacArthur, or a criticism of 
63 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., Report on the FEC: 3 April 1946, in KAY(ed.) volume two, 
p.360 
the United States Government. In the situation where General 
MacArthur and his Allied Council have full publicity, and where the 
United States Government can obtain the desired prominence of any of 
its own statements, the Commission is undoubtedly in the background 
in the eyes of the public in this country.65 
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As well as trouble with SCAP, Berendsen reported that the FEC was not 
functioning properly due to the behaviour of the United States. Writing to Fraser 
on 17 May he said: 
... I am bound to say that I share with my colleagues on the Far Eastern 
Commission a sense of frustration and exasperation due entirely, 
whether for good or inadequate reasons, to the attitude of the United 
States representatives on the Commission ... There is what we all 
believe to be a marked reluctance on the part of the American 
authorities to facilitate the functioning of the Commission, and still a 
marked unwillingness to provide the Commission with the necessary 
66 reports ... 
It is apparent that on each occasion Berendsen reported to Wellington the 
situation for New Zealand had deteriorated a little further. The United States was 
not allowing the FEC to work in the way that New Zealand and the other smaller 
countries had hoped. 
The New Zealand deployment in Japan was uneventful from the start. In terms 
of a military operation (i.e. the disarmament of Japan), the mission was 
completed by 1947. It has even been argued that there had never been a 
64 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P. Report on the FEC: 29 April 1946. ibid. p.379 
65 ibid. pp.379-380 
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'military' job to do in the first place.67 Japan had been completely devastated by 
the war and was in no position to commence fighting again. Militarily, Japan was 
no longer a threat and to prevent it from rising again to threaten the Pacific was 
going to require a political, not a military, solution. 
As well, within seven months of the New Zealand forces arriving in Japan, the 
existence of the BCOF came under threat. The United Kingdom was struggling 
to maintain adequate forces world-wide due to lack of manpower in the army. 
The Viscount Addison, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs wrote to 
Fraser on the 11 November 1946 stating that: 
The salient feature of our army manpower position is that, since we 
fixed our rate of demobilisation, new milltary commitments have arisen, 
and certain other commitments which foreseen ... have not been 
reduced at the rate which we previously expected. As a result there will 
be 752,000 trained men and women in the army on 31 December 1946, 
against the military requirements for 821,000, leaving a deficit of 
69,000.68 
This confirmed New Zealand's concern the United Kingdom would not be able 
to participate fully in Pacific affairs due to a lack of resources. New Zealand had 
decided to take part in the BCOF partly to encourage the United Kingdom to 
continue to be a regional power. However with the manpower shortage, London 
had to prioritise its resources and the North Pacific was not important enough 
66 BERENDSEN, C. to FRASER, P., telegram: 17 May 1946, ibid. p.392 
67 BUCKLEY, R, Occupation Diplomacy: Britain and Japan 1945-1952, Cambridge, 1982 in 
TROTTER, A., New Zealand and Japan, p.71 
when compared to the United Kingdom's other commitments. When this news 
became public, Fraser made a statement saying New Zealand understood that 
"the military commitments which the United Kingdom Government discharge in 
other parts of the world are very heavy." 
Despite the United Kingdom's withdrawal, Fraser went on to reiterate why it 
was important for New Zealand to continue with the BCOF: 
"In joining in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force with the 
governments of the United Kingdom, India and Australia, New Zealand 
is attempting to do her share in securing the victory that force of arms 
won over Japan" 70 
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However, in the same statement, Fraser mentioned New Zealand's own 
manpower problems and suggested that J Force may even be reduced in size to 
help alleviate this problem: 
"I am fully aware ... of the great difficulty that exists at this time in finding 
the manpower required to meet the urgent needs of industry. But it 
must be remembered that those now in J Force will return to industry 
and, in any case, our commitment will in no way be increased. Indeed, 
it may be necessary to decrease it."71 
68 ADDISON to FRASER, P. telegram: 11 November 1946, in KAY(ed.) volume two, pp.1428-
1429 
• FRASER, P. Statement 7 February 1947, in KAY(ed.).volume two. p.1436 
70 ibid. p.1436 
71 ibid. p.1436 
The manpower shortage in New Zealand was serious. The National 
Employment Department said for 23,500 vacancies in industry there were only 
140 semi-employable applications! Pressure was starting to be exerted on the 
Government to withdraw the New Zealand contingent of the BCOF to help this 
problem. The Dominion on 7 December (to which Fraser was replying in the 
above statement) quoted the manager of the Metal Trade Employers of 
Wellington, LR James that: 
"lndustry ... was of the opinion that the constitution of the J-Force was a 
mistake in the first place because it so seriously affected the training of 
apprentices. 72 
And that: 
"Reports from overseas indicate that the British Occupation Force is 
now being withdrawn and we can therefore reasonably question the 
necessity for the New Zealand force"73 
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There was to be further pressure on New Zealand's continued involvement in 
March 1947 when the newly independent Indian Government advised it wanted 
its contingent to be returned home by the end of the year. This effectively 
reduced the British Commonwealth Occupation Force to an Australian dominated 
ANZAC force with some British naval and air assets (and a small army 
contingent). Any idea that New Zealand was contributing to a joint 
72 JAMES, L., statement: 7 February 1947, ibid. p.1437 
73 ibid. p.1437 
Commonwealth effort was shown to be marginalised after only one year of the 
deployment. 
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The other main reason for New Zealand's involvement, that of contributing 
forces to gain influence at the negotiating table, was also under threat. Brigadier 
Stuart, the first commander of 2NZEF (Japan) stated to the Army Secretary as 
early as 20 August 1946 (six months after the New Zealand arrival), "My 
impression was that the Americans were not helpful, and in fact sometimes 
placed obstacles in our way".74 
Further, and as has already been indicated, the United States did not take the 
FEC at all seriously with Berendsen saying the attitude of the United States was 
causing the FEC to be "nothing but a joke.75 
The United States regarded the occupation and rebuilding of Japan as an 
American affair and to a large degree made any effort by New Zealand and the 
other Commonwealth countries rather irrelevant as noted by Berendsen, writing 
to Fraser on 31 May: 
All my previous comments on the increasing futile efforts of the 
Commission to carry out its terms of reference remain valid. Over the 
whole work of the Commission hangs the shadow of the veto of the 
United States- more impenetrable because it seems most difficult to 
ascertain exactly what the United States policy is on a particular 
matter ... Then ... ifthe United States policy has been declared on a 
74 STEWART, K., to CONWAY, A., Report on the BCOF, ibid. p.1412 
75 BERENDSEN, C., Memoirs, Book 3, 1944-1952, unpublished, 4 June 1946, in TROTTER, A., 
New Zealand and Japan, p.39 
matter ... and the Commission wishes to change it, the process of 
changing the United States policy in respect to Japan seems to involve 
clearances through so many different agencies that the expected result 
is infrequently achieved.76 
He continued that: 
But even more important and more frustrating is the general attitude of 
the United States representatives on the Commission from the 
Chairman down. Acting quite probably on instructions, they definitely 
assume in all cases a role that might be described as that of a 
"MacArthur Protection League." There is resistance either explicit or 
implicit, to any proposed course of action which would involve the 
slightest deviation from the line that has been adopted by the Supreme 
Commander77 
Alister McIntosh, the New Zealand Secretary of External affairs wrote back to 
Berendsen on the 25 July agreeing with the Washington Minister's views on the 
FEC: 
Unfortunately, the facts seem to support your judgement that the United 
States is not genuinely interested in making the Commission an 
effective body, as was, perhaps, indicated from the first by the calibre of 
the delegates which she chose to represent her.78 
New Zealand was in the same situation it had found itself earlier. That is, 
having to (grudgingly) accept what the United States did simply because as a 
small country it could do nothing about it. 
76 BEREN OSEN, C. to FRASER, P. Report:31 May 1946, in KAY(ed.) volume two, p.453 
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As the time passed reasons for a continued New Zealand presence in Japan 
became more and more difficult to find. The British (and less so the Indian) 
withdrawal had put to an end to the New Zealand attempt to use the BCOF as a 
way of keeping Pacific security to the forefront of United Kingdom thinking. 
Equally; the United States attitude towards the FEC and other countries involved 
in the Japanese occupation offered no support for a continuing British or even 
New Zealand presence. 
The justification for New Zealand's' involvement in the BCOF came under 
increasing pressure. Fraser wrote to Joseph Chifley, the Australian Prime 
Minister on 22 February 1947: 
Notwithstanding this, and the serious doubt we feel as to the value of 
continued British participation in the military occupation of Japan, we 
are anxious to do what we can, with our Commonwealth partners, in 
contributing to the security of the Pacific. We would however suggest 
that the whole position be reviewed. It seems to us that purely military 
tasks must be reducing, so permitting some overall reduction in the size 
of the force to be maintained. 
Furthermore, the existence of the force does not afford to any of the 
participating governments any share in the military government of 
Japan and an opportunity, therefore, of influencing directly the 
development of democratic institutions and a way of life in Japan which 
will not be a menace to the future security of the Pacific. It is doubtful, 
also, whether the existence of the force is of any value to us in the 
advocacy generally of policies affecting Japan, while its maintenance in 
78 MACINTOSH, A, to BERENDSEN, C. telegram: 25 July 1945, ibid. p.453 
a position of substantial inferiority to the Americans tends to diminish 
our prestige in the eyes of the Japanese.79 
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The New Zealand Government was quickly coming to the view there was little 
to be gained through a continued role in the BCOF. The reasons for the initial 
deployment were no longer present, the benefits of the deployment were minimal 
and the manpower shortage back in New Zealand was serious. 
This view was not unanimous though. The New Zealand's Minister in 
Washington, despite his frustrations with the American attitude felt that if New 
Zealand was to pull its forces out, it would lose any chance of making a 
contribution to the peace settlement. He wrote on the 25 February 1947 to 
Fraser that: 
We have from time to time supported the view that a lengthy occupation 
is obviously necessary if we are to ensure a peaceful Japan and we 
cannot wtth propriety suggest lengthy occupation, or indeed support it, if 
we are not prepared to take on our proportional part. 
Withdraw in whole or in part of New Zealand's forces in Japan might 
well have a proportionally detrimental effect on the chances of being 
accorded a proper voice and vote on the peace treaty.80 
New Zealand decided at this time to reduce the size of its contribution to two 
thousand four hundred men, down from the original four thousand two hundred 
and thirty nine. The United States did not question the reduction in forces and 
79 FRASER, p. to CHIFEL Y, J., telegram: 22 February 1947, ibid. p.1439 
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only asked that the publicity on the reductions be made public by SCAP. The 
lack of concern by the United States with the New Zealand action lends weight to 
the idea that New Zealand simply did not come into their considerations. 
If the New Zealand was making a meaningful contribution to the occupation 
and its participation was of value to the United States, it would be reasonable to 
assume the United States would have suggested that New Zealand stay and not 
have accepted the withdrawal without question. The reality of the situation was, 
at this stage, the United States was not concerned about New Zealand 
participation, otherwise they would have encouraged New Zealand to continue to 
be part of the occupation. Clearly what New Zealand did, or did not do, was not 
particularly important to the United States. 
At the end of September 1947, four months after the New Zealand force 
reduction, the United Kingdom announced it would be withdrawing the last of its 
forces from Japan. This provided New Zealand with the opportunity to withdraw 
fully as well. If the United Kingdom could pull out due to manpower problems, as 
well as out of frustration at not being able to influence United States attitude, 
New Zealand surely could withdraw under the same circumstances. Any decision 
to stay could only have been as a part of an Australian force with little prospect in 
achieving the earlier laudable goals. 
80 BERENDSEN, C., to FRASER, P., telegram: 25 February, ibid. pp.1440-1441 
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While attending a Cabinet meeting in Wellington on the 7 February 1948, 
Fraser discussed the possibility of withdrawing the remainder of the New Zealand 
forces with the Commander of the BCOF, Lieutenant General Robertson. It was 
also pointed out by the New Zealand military that the New Zealand presence 
could not be reduced in size again as one battalion and one squadron, (which 
had been suggested by the Australians) would be too small to be viable. 
The withdrawal of the New Zealand forces continued and on 5 March 1948 
Wellington asked Australia to notify the United States that New Zealand would be 
withdrawing the remainder of its forces from Japan. Again, there was no protest 
by the United States at the New Zealand decision. The last of the New Zealand 
forces returned home the end of 1948, bringing to an end New Zealand's first 
post war deployment 
Conclusion 
The defeat and surrender of Japan shows the dilemma of small states in 
international relations. That is their degree of participation and influence is 
dependent upon the will of larger states. New Zealand had declared war upon 
and had participated in the defeat of Japan, yet this granted neither status at the 
signing of the surrender document nor a place at the settlement table negotiating 
the final settlement. It was the United States who determined the role New 
Zealand could play. 
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As a small state, New Zealand was in no posttion to dictate to the Untted 
States. The situation was exaggerated by the dominance of the Untted States in 
the post war period which ensured tt could do pretty much what tt wanted. With 
the Soviet Union not yet a superpower, and the United Nations not yet an 
effective body, the Untted States did not necessarily have to take other nations 
into consideration. 
Wellington had attempted to influence Washington by actively participating in 
the occupation of Japan and by indirectly by appealing to the United Kingdom to 
act on its behalf. However, neither of these approaches worked to any great 
extent. All that was obtained, after much consternation, was a concession to 
sign the surrender document and have a limited say in the final negotiations, 
(which the United States ignored anyway). New Zealand hoped by being part of 
the BCOF it might have a say in the treaty, but this did not help at all. 
Berendsen's frustrations with the United States attttude towards the FEC 
illustrated this point very clearly. New Zealand's military contribution meant very 
little, if anything, to the United States and hence gained very little political 'clout' 
to further New Zealand's goals. 
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New Zealand saw itself as an independent country and was clearly acting as 
such when it decided to send forces to participate in the occupation of Japan at 
the end of the war. Peter Fraser continued on the path set out by Savage and 
the Labour Government of looking after New Zealand's interests before those of 
others, namely the United Kingdom. New Zealand believed if it contributed to 
what became known as the BCOF it would benefit from this contribution. These 
benefits were to be a continued British and Commonwealth military presence in 
the Pacific and to have a say in the final peace settlement with Japan. There 
was also the desire for New Zealand to be seen as a 'good citizen' in the 
international sphere. If New Zealand wanted to be treated as an independent 
nation by others, it had to act like one.81 
However rather than simply following the United Kingdom because it was part 
of a 'greater Britain,' New Zealand aligned itself with the United Kingdom 
because it was believed that it would be of greatest benefit to New Zealand. 
Despite the hopes that went with New Zealand into the deployment, the BCOF 
was singularly unsuccessful. While it was certainly not a disaster, as New 
Zealand did not suffer any adverse consequences other than a slightly worsening 
of the manpower situation at home, in terms of achieving diplomatic goals it 
produced little result. 
81 FRASER, P ., statement: 7 February 1947, ibid p.1436 
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The primary expectation of keeping the United Kingdom involved in Pacific 
security did not happen. After only seven months of being in theatre, the United 
Kingdom withdrew the majority of its ground forces, and within a year had 
decided to pull out its remaining naval and air forces. 
New Zealand was aware that the United Kingdom would have problems 
maintaining its worldwide commitments in the post-war world, but hoped to use 
the BCOF as a way of keeping them in the Pacific. These commitments proved 
too much for the United Kingdom and they determined the costs of continued 
involvement were not worth the benefits to them. 
The hope of New Zealand contributing to Commonwealth unity never 
materialised. Only four members contributed forces and two of those, the United 
Kingdom and India, decided to withdraw some, if not all of their forces within the 
first year of operations. If anything it showed the concept of Imperial or 
Commonwealth security was not a viable option. New Zealand continued to hold 
to the notion of a Commonwealth based system, but only one other independent 
commonwealth country, Australia, was interested in such a scheme. The United 
Kingdom was not powerful enough to meet its commitments elsewhere and 
maintain a credible presence in the Pacific. 
The New Zealand actions clearly followed Vital's 'active' policy framework in 
that New Zealand attempted to influence the external environment to its 
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advantage. By being part of the BCOF, New Zealand hoped to persuade both 
the United Kingdom to remain a Pacific power and the United States to include it 
in the formulation of the Japan settlement. In both cases however, New 
Zealand's policy did not work. 
Notwithstanding, New Zealand clearly did not simply accept that it was too 
small to contribute in a meaningful manner, either militarily or diplomatically. In 
the end its size counted against it, but it was certainly not prepared to lie down 
and do nothing. The result may have been the same, but this does not mean 
that New Zealand followed Vital's 'passive' policy of doing nothing. New Zealand 
did try to influence the United Kingdom and the United States. It just did not work 
If New Zealand had simply accepted the United States attitude towards the 
surrender and occupation of Japan it would have followed the 'passive' policy 
framework: it did not. It did not accept either explicitly or implicitly that it was 
other than an independent entity. Thus it could not be classified as taking a 
'passive' approach. 
In terms of the hypothesises, numbers one and two were shown to be valid, 
however the third was not in this case study. 
H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when 
deciding its external affairs policy. 
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The fact that both the United Kingdom and the United States advised New 
Zealand to keep the 2nd NZ Division in the Middle East is not evidence the actual 
decision to do so was not made in Wellington. Indeed, if New Zealand had 
wanted to move the force to the Pacific, (as did Australia) there in no suggestion 
they would have been prevented from doing so. In simple terms, New Zealand's 
interests agreed with the advice given by its larger allies. 
Again, despite being asked by the United Kingdom to be part of a British 
Commonwealth force in Japan, New Zealand made the decision on its own in 
pursuit of its own interests. New Zealand had independently declared war upon 
Japan and had contributed forces to the Pacific war without those of Britain. The 
decision to send forces was made by a government, under Peter Fraser, who 
considered themselves to be representatives of an increasingly independent 
country. They made their decisions accordingly. 
H2 New Zealand acted in a way to first benefit New Zealand and not another 
country. 
The decision of Wellington to enter the war with Japan and not to re-deploy the 
New Zealand forces to the Pacific theatre was made with New Zealand interests 
to the fore. The Japanese advance was obviously of concern to New Zealand, 
but it was realised that returning the 2nd NZ Division from the Middle East was not 
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in the best interests of either New Zealand, the United Kingdom or the United 
States. The logistics of relocating the division would have placed a strain on the 
allied war effort and this could only have benefited the enemy they were trying to 
defeat. 
It was its own post war security concerns that led to New Zealand's decision to 
participate in the BCOF and not concerns for the United Kingdom. The 
deployment actually revealed a policy difference between New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom; New Zealand placed greater importance on the operation and 
the goals it hoped to achieve than the United Kingdom, which started 
withdrawing only seven months into the deployment. 
This difference between the two countries regarding the deployment reinforces 
the hypothesis that New Zealand's decision for deploying were its own. If New 
Zealand was simply acting on behalf of the United Kingdom, it would logically 
have had the same level of enthusiasm for continuing the deployment as the 
United Kingdom. This was not the case however as shown by Fraser's 
statement after the United Kingdom announced its withdrawal that it was still 
important for New Zealand to continue its presence in Japan.82 
H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relations 
goals. 
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New Zealand's goal of witnessing the defeat of the Japanese in the Pacific was 
reached, though this obviously was a result of the United States military 
involvement in this theatre. Nonetheless to the extent possible New Zealand 
played its part. 
In terms of the BCOF, New Zealand did not achieve its goal of keeping the 
Pacific to the forefront of United Kingdom thinking. If anything can be taken from 
the surrender and occupation of Japan, it was the continuing maturity of New 
Zealand's foreign policy. The BCOF was a failure for New Zealand, but it was 
'New Zealand's failure.' 
The decision to send forces was made in Wellington in anticipation of benefits 
for New Zealand. In the end these did not materialise, but this was not to be 
known at the time. What can be concluded however is that in the post war world 




The Formulation of the ANZUS Pact 
This chapter will examine the events leading to the signing of The Security 
Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) on 1 
September 1951. New Zealand's experience in obtaining a security guarantee 
(in the form of the ANZUS Pact) is an example of a small state successfully 
achieving external affairs objectives with a much larger and powerful nation, (in 
this case the United States). 
The ANZUS Pact was a further development of an independent New Zealand 
external affairs policy. For the first time in its history, New Zealand undertook a 
security arrangement that did not contain the United Kingdom and which did 
contain a non-Commonwealth member - the United States of America. 
The first part of this chapter will briefly look at the newly elected National 
Government with emphasis on the attitudes of the Prime Minister Sydney 
Holland, and the External Affairs Minister Frederick Doidge, towards relations 
with the United Kingdom. 
Given the events of the time, it is important to also look at the Korean War. 
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This was the first major external relations crisis which faced the new government. 
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It is also important as the war was the catalyst, though not Jhe cause, of the 
formation of the ANZUS Pact. For this reason, New Zealand's involvement in the 
Korean War will comprise the second part of this chapter. The third and major 
part of this chapter will review the formation of a Pacific Pact and later the 
ANZUS Pact. 
The National Party in coming to power in 1950 decided an American security 
guarantee for New Zealand was vital for the future security of the country. This 
will also be examined in the third part of this chapter, as well an examination why 
an American security undertaking was important to both New Zealand and 
Australia (which shared similar views) and how this desire to obtain a security 
guarantee led to the ANZUS pact. The attitude of the United Kingdom will also 
be examined in this part of the chapter and the New Zealand reaction it. 
The main theme of this chapter is that New Zealand, despite opposition by the 
United Kingdom, was prepared to follow a policy it believed to be in its interests 
by persuading the United States to agree to New Zealand's views. This chapter 
will also reveal that a radical change occurred in external relations decision 
making. New Zealand (under Holland) was unwilling to make a decision 
concerning military forces to Korea without checking with the United Kingdom, 
but was prepared to actively pursue the ANZUS Pact in isolation despite knowing 
that the United Kingdom had serious concerns about it. 
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The New National Government 
The 1949 general election saw a change in New Zealand's government with 
the National Party under the leadership of Sydney Holland coming into power. 
The previous Labour Government first under Savage and later Fraser, had 
moved New Zealand away from the United Kingdom towards a more 
independent external affairs outlook. This approach had been heavily criticised 
by the National Party while in opposition for its supposed 'disloyalty' to the 
'Mother-Country.'83 The National Party was fiercely 'pro-British', so much so that 
M McKinnon wrote in Independence and Foreign Policy that: 
Holland took up Savage's phrase, 'where Britain goes we go,' to the 
extent that it completely lost its original context and became a partisan 
motto for the foreign policy of his government.84 
The principles of the new Prime Minister, Holland, were simple according to 
David McIntyre; " loyalty to the Empire and free enterprise."85 The 'Dear old 
Empire' was very close his heart and he proudly described himself as a "Britisher 
through and through."86 Holland also did not have a great interest in external 
83 
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84 ibid. p.113 
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affairs, preferring instead the finance portfolio. This was reflected in the choice of 
the responsibilities he took upon himself. 
The incoming government failed to impress the fledgling external affairs 
department and this caused problems for Alister McIntosh, Head of both the 
Prime Minister's Department and External Affairs. Because of Holland's 
disinterest and general attitude toward the issues arising in New Zealand's 
external affairs, McIntosh did not have a sound relationship with the new Prime 
Minister. He wrote to Berendsen in Washington on March 6 1950: 
One of the great difficulties about Mr Holland is that he is seeing far 
too many people other than the officials in his office. He likes to have 
his evenings to himself, and his weekends, and he just can't read 
papers or at any rate he won't. He insists that matters be put to him 
with the conventional ministerial page of foolscap but, actually, he likes 
it best to have his problems served up to him on a slip of paper that a 
boy could read on his bike. As you will readily admit, there are very few 
problems that can be dealt with in such summary form and with the brief 
and diffused attention for which a boy's bike note is normally drafted.87 
McIntosh reacted by concentrating on external affairs and directed his deputy, 
Foss Shanahan, to run the Prime Ministers department. However, the Minister 
for External Affairs, Frederick Doidge, aggravated McIntosh even more! As he 
wrote to Berendsen in another letter on 1 February 1950: 
87 MCINTOSH, A, to BERENDSEN, C. letter: 6 March 1950, in MCGIBBON, l.(ed.) Undiplomatic 
Dialouge. p.216 
He is 65, inordinately vain, still a journalist rather than a Minister; he 
shows no desire to discuss matters and, unless he manages to develop 
an interest of his own, he just won't concentrate on mastering any topic. 
It is very difficult to get him to grasp a new idea and even more difficult 
to steer him off one of his own
88 
As well as failing to impress the Secretary for External affairs, Doidge did not 
have much standing in Cabinet89 He was as fiercely 'pro-British" as Holland. 
George Perkins90 wrote to Dean Acheson: 91 
Mr Doidge has been described as being more English than an 
Englishman. He is extremely Empire-conscious and to him loyalty to 
the crown is almost a religion.92 
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Holland and Doidge, two men with very little experience (and in the case of 
Holland little interest) and attitudes more in line with New Zealand circa 1920 
were to be two of the key participants in the up coming Korean War which would 
start less than a year after their election victory. 
New Zealand had changed from a political leadership (Fraser and the Labour 
party) which had a keen interest in external affairs and a desire to pursue a 'New 
Zealand voice' to one that, at the beginning of its term at least, desired only to 
follow the United Kingdom. This had the potential to alter radically the direction 
88 MCINTOSH, A., to BERENDSEN, C. letter: 1 February 1950, ibid. p.203 
89 MCGIBBON, I., New Zealand and the Korean War: volume one: Politics & Diplomacy (hereafter 
NZKW: volume one), Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992. p.98 
90 United States Assistant Secretary of State 
91 
United States Secretary of State 
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New Zealand was heading. The first test of this was to arise quickly with the 
Korean eris is. 
The Korean War 
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In 1894 both Japan and China invaded Korea in support of opposing sides after 
an outbreak of hostilities on the peninsular. The Japanese who had for centuries 
seen Korea as strategically vital (as it provided an important route to invade 
mainland China) defeated the Chinese and began an unwelcome occupation. 
Over the next ten years Japan exercised total control over Korea and in 1905 it 
became a Japanese protectorate. 
Understandably, the Koreans did not accept this. However, the Japanese 
mercilessly crushed any form of resistance. During the Second World War, of 
the resistance groups, the communists (despite the fact that they were divided 
into two rival and often combative camps, - Russian and Chinese) were the most 
effective. Some Koreans fought the Japanese along side the Chinese 
communists in China, one of these being Kim Sung-ju, later known as Kim 11-
sung. 
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Korea was a Japanese colony until 1942 when it became part of Japan. 
However, it was the intention of the United States that a united and independent 
Korea would emerge from the defeat of Japan. At the end of 1943, along with 
Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill, Roosevelt said: 
The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the 
people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become 
free and independent.93 
Following the defeat of Japan, the Korean peninsula was 'liberated' by the 
allies. The Soviet Union, which had only just declared war on Japan, accepted 
the surrender in the North of the country whereas the United States did the same 
in the South94• Control of the country was now split along the 38th Parallel with 
the North coming under the 'influence' of the Soviet Union and the people to the 
South the United States. 
The United States desire for an independent Korea was not be realised. With 
the Cold War just beginning neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was 
prepared to relinquish dominance over the other part of Korea. A communist 
government was formed in Pyongyang and a right wing military government in 
the South. 
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Both governments and their backers wanted unification, but as both regarded 
the other as illegitimate, it had to be on their terms. Elections95 were held in the 
South on May 1 O 1948 and on August 15 1948 the newly elected President Rhee 
declared the independent state of the Republic of Korea. One month later, the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea was declared in the North under the 
leadership of Premier Kim II-sung. 
The United Nations and western countries recognised the southern 
government while the communist countries recognised the north. The Koreans 
may have had their 'independence,' but at the price of the country being split in 
half with two diametrically opposed governments. The governments in Seoul and 
Pyongyang each considered themselves as the only legitimate rulers of the 
whole country and border clashes, started in 1948 and continued through into 
"1950 as the relationship between the two deteriorated even further. 
On 25 June 1950 North Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into South 
Korea starting the Korean War. In New York a meeting of the United Nations 
Security Council was quickly called the same day and a resolution condemning 
North Korea's action was passed. The motion also called for the member states 
to make contributions in support of the resolution. The Soviet Union did not 
attend the meeting however and declared any action made by the United Nations 
void. 
95 The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised the elections. New Zealand 
was not part of UNTCOK 
The United States considered the invasion as evidence of the expansionist 
nature of communism and believed the Kremlin was behind such a policy. As 
noted by McGibbon in New Zealand & The Korean War: 
The North Korean attack had not only occurred at a time when the 
climate of opinion in Washington was conducive to a firm stand against 
communist encroachment but also appeared to validate assumptions 
about United States security which had been included in the just-
completed major review of policy. The resulting document, NSC68 
stressed the urgency of meeting the Soviet challenge, which was 
expected to become more aggressive ... Since the struggle had become 
worldwide, the 'defeat of free institutions anywhere' would be 'a defeat 
anywhere.'96 
In New Zealand the Secretary of External Affairs, McIntosh, briefed the 
Government on 29 June 1950 on what he saw as New Zealand's obligations to 
South Korea in light of the United Nations Charter: 
New Zealand is not under any specific obligation to supply any armed 
forces. However, the Charter prescribes that the United Nations 
Security Council "may take action by air, sea or land forces." Under 
Article 43 of the Charter, all members were expected to conclude 
agreements with the United Nations as to the extent of such 
contributions they would be prepared to pledge. These agreements 
have not been concluded. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that other Articles of the Charter, e.g. 
42, 48 and 49, taken together impose a general obligation to co-operate 
in carrying out measures which the Security Council may decide. It is 
96 MCGIBBON, I., NZKW: volume one, p.96 
82 
more a political than a legal question. The United States having taken 
the lead, and Britain followed, other members of the Commonwealth, 
and particularly New Zealand and Australia, have to decide whether 
they will also contribute practical support now or later.97 
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Later the same day Prime Minister Holland made a statement to the House on 
the situation in Korea. The statement fully agreed with McIntosh's view given 
earlier in the day. He stated that the New Zealand Government backed the 
action taken by the United Nations Security Council and: 
Despite the fact that the arrangements contemplated in Article 43 of the 
Charter have not been concluded, because of disagreements between 
the leading members, and there are no formal agreements with the 
Security Council under which members would make available to the 
Council armed forces and other assistance which the Council could call 
upon and use where necessary, the New Zealand Government hold the 
· view that the Security Council has a clear duty to maintain international 
peace and security, and they feel that it is incumbent upon members of 
the United Nations to give their full co-operation in all endeavours to 
achieve that end.98 
However, this convergence of views between the Prime Minister and his 
External Affairs Secretary is misleading. Writing to Berendsen on the 4 July, 
Macintosh said that: 
The Korean business has indeed been very odd from our point of view. 
Mr Holland was not at all anxious to take any part and the statement 
97 PM 324/2/3 pt1, Briefing by McIntosh to Cabinet: 29 June 1950 
98 NZPD: 29 June 1950 
that he made was decided upon during the lunch hour, to enable him to 
make it in the House.99 
Indeed, Holland was more interested in the British response than any advice 
given by his own officials.100 This singularly failed to impress Macintosh at the 
time. However, this is very harsh for in reality there were very few options 
available to Holland at this early stage. 
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In terms of a military response, Truman's initial reaction was to support South 
Korea with air and sea power. This was supported by the United Kingdom which 
decided to dispatch naval forces to the region. As New Zealand was not in a 
position to offer any aircraft any military response would have to take the form of 
a naval contribution. With the extremely close ties between the RN and the 
RNZN any New Zealand response would be co-ordinated with London. 
Holland had been in power for less than a year and was still naive in the 
external realm. It is understandable therefore that he would want to follow the 
United Kingdom's lead rather than 'beat his own path.' It is doubtful whether 
New Zealand would have reacted differently under any other administration, as at 
this early stage there were very few options other than condemnation of the 
attack, consultation with the United States, the United Kingdom, other members 
of the Commonwealth and the offer of naval forces. 
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The same day Holland made his statement to the House (29 June), the frigates 
HMNZS Pukaki and HMNZS Tutira (the only New Zealand ships available) were 
made available to the RN Far Eastern Fleet for operations in Korea. 
By publicly stating New Zealand's outrage at the North Korean attack and his 
government's support for the actions of the United Nations, the United States and 
the United Kingdom, he declared New Zealand's position. 
Berendsen writing to McIntosh later the same month noted that Holland's 
statements had gone down well in Washington. 101 Berendsen viewed the Korean 
War and the reaction by the United Nations and the Western governments as 
crucial for the future of both the United Nations and the world as a whole. He 
wrote to Doidge on 4 July i 950 about the outbreak of fighting on the Korean 
Peninsula, ending with a passionate plea on the importance of the United 
Nations responding to the North Korean invasion: 
If fate allows, and we chose to make rt so, this could, indeed be a 
turning point in the history of the world. By this decision and by this 
action we could "this day light a candle, by God's Grace, as shall never 
be put out''-a beacon that for generations and centuries to come may 
guide the faltering footsteps of men of Goodwill in their search for world 
peace. I can see the possibilrty, and I rejoice to see it, that if we guide 
and comport ourselves aright, with wisdom and wrth resolution, we may 
indeed be on our way to solve the greatest political problem of our age. 
Dialouge, p.233 
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Time and the event will show-but, here and now, a great opportunity 
does present itself.102 
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Despite the rapid response by the United Nations, and particularly the United 
States, the situation in Korea quickly deteriorated. It became clear that to stop 
the North Korean advance the member states of the United Nations would need 
to provide more than sea and air power: ground forces were to be needed. 
Two weeks after Holland announced to the House that New Zealand was 
sending HMNZS Pukaki and HMNZS Tutira a request from the United Nations 
Secretary General for more military forces, particularly ground troops, was 
received in Wellington. 
New Zealand's defence priority was, however, at this time focused on providing 
forces for the Middle East - in case a 'third world war' broke out. There were no 
ground units available to the government for a deployment to Korea as all were 
earmarked for a possible, rapid deployment to Middle East. 
However the General Staff advised, that it would be possible to specially raise a 
unit of about one thousand men to fight in Korea without causing too much 
disruption to the Middle East commitment. 103 Yet, as with the initial naval 
deployment, Holland was not keen on a deployment and sought the views of 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada on their policy towards ground forces. 
102 PM 324/2/3 BERENDSEN,C. to DOIDGE,F. memorandum: 4 July 1950 
None of the other Commonwealth could at this stage, foresee themselves 
providing a ground contribution. 
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However, discussions with Australia and the United Kingdom about what form 
any possible deployment would take continued over the next ten days. If New 
Zealand was to send forces it had been suggested these could be part of a 
'Commonwealth Division' containing combat forces from the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The idea of such a force had been around 
at least since July 3 when the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
recommended that any force sent to Korea should be a Commonwealth rather 
than purely British force. 104 
A Commonwealth force suited New Zealand as it could support both the United 
Nations and the United States within an organisation (i.e. the Commonwealth) 
that it was familiar105 with. This was because the Commonwealth militaries were 
very much alike in structure, equipment and training. 
Accordingly, New Zealand decided that if there was to be a ground 
contribution, it would be in the form of artillery. It was believed that artillery would 
be less likely to sustain heavy losses and would provide the least amount of 
disruption to the Middle East commitment. The Australians, however, pressured 
103 MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one p.92 
104 SCHNABEL & WATSON, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs od Staff and 
National Policy, volume three, Michael Glazier, Wilmington, 1979, p.150 in MACINTRYRE, W. 
Background to the ANZUS Pact, p274 
New Zealand to provide an infantry battalion to be part of an Anzac Brigade. 
Macintosh wrote to Berendsen that: 
... the Australians are doing their best to build up an Anzac Brigade to 
which we [would be according to the Australian plan] ... contributing a 
battalion of infantry. That is the very thing that we don't want to do. We 
can supply Artillery. We would feel safer in having this particular type of 
unit and my own views is that we should stick to it.106 
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He also noted the Prime Minister's performance in dealing with the Australians 
on this matter: 
There is no doubt that Fadden, perhaps on Menzies' instructions, tried 
to bustle Mr Holland, and I give our man full marks for the way he 
handled the matter107 
However the situation moved forward rapidly. On 25 July 1950 the United 
Kingdom announced suddenly to New Zealand they would be sending a ground 
contingent to Korea. 
This was a major shock to both New Zealand and Australia as they had no 
forewarning of the British decision. The United Kingdom had also advised them 
not to send forces as it would disrupt Middle East commitments.108 The British 
105 MCGIBBON, I., NZKW, volume one, p.288 
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announcement was due to fears of possible adverse effects on the United 
Kingdom/United States relationship had they continued to hold out. 
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Holland and the government had come to the conclusion that if New Zealand 
was to contribute land forces it would be preferable for there to be a co-ordinated 
response from the Commonwealth. 109 As soon as the United Kingdom had made 
it known they were to commit troops New Zealand needed to make a very quick 
decision on whether to follow lest they be seen to be 'out of step' with the United 
Kingdom. 
On 26 July at 1930 hrs, (only a few hours after the cable from Britain) Holland 
informed the House New Zealand would be sending an artillery unit to Korea. 
The timing pre-empted both the UK and Australia, who made similar 
announcements over the next few hours. The result was that a false impression 
of Commonwealth unity among the Commonwealth countries existed, when in 
reality there had been little. 
Holland had simply followed the United Kingdom in this case. There is no 
reason to believe he would have sent ground troops without it being part of a 
Commonwealth effort. As with the decision to send the frigates, the government 
did in the end pursue a policy in line with the advice of its senior advisors (i.e. 
McIntosh and Berendsen), but the decision had more to do with the actions of the 
United Kingdom rather than the argument of the New Zealand officials. 
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The New Zealand contingent was to be known as Kayforce, the main body of 
which reached Korea on the 1 O December 1950. On the evening of 24 January, 
in response to an Australian request, the New Zealand gunners saw action for 
the first time. Over tlie next two and a half years the New Zealander's 
distinguished themselves as an outstanding artillery unit of the war. 110 The 
fighting continued until 28 July 1953 when the cease-fire came into effect111 • 
Thirty-three New Zealanders died on active service in Korea with another eighty 
one wounded. New Zealand forces stayed in the region for a further four years 
monitoring the Armistice with the last New Zealand military personnel returning 
home in 1957. 
The reasons for New Zealand's involvement had largely been vindicated. New 
Zealand had followed Britain into Korea with the initial decision to send the two 
frigates, followed by the ground force, both serving within a British 
Commonwealth environment. Although the formation of the Commonwealth 
force had not been made with the degree of solidarity Holland had hoped for, 
when it did come together it worked well 
By contributing forces New Zealand had furthered the case of Commonwealth 
unity and defence. It also succeeded in its external affairs policy of keeping 
109 MCGIBBON, I. NZKW, volume one, p.284 
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closely aligned with Britain while trying to achieve wider goals, (i.e. supporting 
the United Nations and United States). 
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New Zealand's support of the United Nations had also been justified. The 
United Nations and the West had stood up to what it saw as blatant communist 
aggression by stopping the North Korean invasion, although unification was no 
closer to fruition under a democratic government.112 The fighting ended in 
stalemate after considerable destruction, with neither side gaining an advantage. 
Nonetheless, South Korea lived on and by being involved New Zealand had 
helped prevent the United Nations from going the same way as the League of 
Nations. 
There was also another factor, though small, that influenced the New Zealand 
decision to send ground forces. This was a desire to gain influence with the 
United States in order to gain a possible security guarantee. 
Although not as yet widespread, a growing feeling was forming in New Zealand 
that an alliance with the United States would be highly beneficial. However, if 
New Zealand were seen not to back the United Nations and Washington in Korea 
with ground forces, it would make an alliance with the United States much harder 
to obtain. As Berendsen noted on July 17, 1950: 
112 O'NEILL, R. Australia in the Korean War 1950: volume one: Strategy and Diplomacy. The 
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[The Americans were] now regarding this incident as a means of 
'separating the sheep from the goats' and of distinguishing those 
countries who can be relied upon from those who cannot, and they 
show some signs of regarding this as a test for those who might, at the 
proper time in future, form the foundation of [a] Pacific pact.113 
A Pacific Pact 
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The years after the end of the Second World War saw the beginning of the 
Cold War. Communism was viewed by the West as an evil force attempting to 
take over the world. Both Hungary in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948, came 
under Soviet control and the blockade of Berlin in 1948 was further 'proof' of the 
communist threat. 
As a result, the Atlantic Pact was formulated to meet the perceived Soviet 
threat in Western Europe. Signed on 4 April 1949 by the nations of Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, it was a 
defensive Pact to deter any possible invasion by the Soviet Union. 
Peter Fraser submitted the idea of a similar Pacific Pact during his Prime 
Ministerial visit to Canada on 8 January 1949. However while reflecting on the 
establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty three months later in April 
he did not see the formation of an Pacific Pact as an urgent priority, but: 
113 MCGIBBON, I. NZKW: volume one, p.91 
If the need arose for the democratic nations of the Pacific to stand 
together, I am sure we would see a Pacific Pact developing, along the 
lines of the Atlantic Pact, which is shaping up now. 
Such a pact. .. would obviously [sic] include New Zealand, Australia, 
Britain, Canada, the United States, Mexico and certain of the Central 
and South American nations. 114 
The countries named by Fraser above were simply the ones he thought of at 
the time. He was speaking 'off the cuff' in an interview and was not expressing 
government policy in any way. 
93 
Replying to a question· in the House later in the same year he again reiterated 
the position that if the need arose; a Pacific pact would come into beginning. He 
also commented that: 
New Zealand's co-operation on defence problems with the United 
Kingdom and Australia is an important beginning in promoting security 
arrangements in the Pacific, and these will be extended with other 
democratic countries as circumstances permit. [Emphasis added by 
author]115 
Clearly New Zealand did not see the need for a regional pact at this stage even 
if the possibility of a communist invasion was seen as a threat in the foreseeable 
future. Indeed, it was not the direct threat of a communist invasion which 
114 FRASER, P. statement: 8 January 1948, in KAY, R.(ed.) Documents on New Zealand External 
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concerned New Zealand the most. The idea of a rearmed and once again 
powerful Japan was seen as a major threat to Pacific, and hence New Zealand's, 
security. 116 
The final Japanese Peace Treaty had not been determined and New Zealand, 
along with Australia, were anxious to see that any treaty would not allow Japan to 
rebuild its military power. Unless Japan rearmed or a direct communist threat 
emerged, New Zealand did not have requirement for a Pacific security 
arrangement. 
New Zealand still saw the United Kingdom rather than the United States as the 
cornerstone of its Pacific security policy. This, surprisingly, despite the failure of 
the United Kingdom to stop the Japanese during the Second World War, its 
inability to even sustain a brigade during the occupation of Japan and the 
obvious fact that it was literally on the other side of the earth. The United States, 
upon which any Pacific pact would be based, on the other hand had stopped the 
Japanese, was clearly the dominant military force in the world and actually 
bordered the Pacific. 
Still the idea of a Pacific Pact was not universally accepted. It was hoped in 
many corners that the United Nations, unlike its predecessor the League of 
Nations, would become the forum where international disputes and issues would 
115 FRASER, P. statement: 20 July 1949, NZPD: volume 285, pp.576-7 
be resolved. New Zealand in particular had been a strong supporter and 
advocate of the United Nations both during its formation and its early years. 
Berendsen reflected the view that the United Nations should be the lead 
organisation in international affairs and not regional alliances. In a letter to 
Frederick Doidge on 14 March 1950 he said: 
I do not myself believe in regional arrangements for peace or 
defence.117 
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Berendsen wanted the United Nations, not regional alliances, to be the 
foundation for world peace. This was actually counter to the United Nations 
Charter which saw regional alliances as very important to maintaining 
international stability. But he also understood the United Nations had quickly 
become impotent after it had been set up. The United Nations and its authority 
clearly played 'second fiddle" to the realities of the Cold War. The five 
permanent members of the Security Council with their power of veto ensured the 
United Nations was not going to fulfil the role that countries like New Zealand had 
hoped. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, two ideological opposites and distrusting enemies were always going 
to struggle to find common ground. 
Berendsen realised this fact rather reluctantly and said in the same letter: 
116 DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, memorandum on the General Attitude to the 
But where we cannot achieve a world system of collective security then 
I am entirely ready to accept a regional system as the best available, 
and my principal regret in respect of the Atlantic Pact is that it is 
confined to the Atlantic Powers and to the Atlantic area.118 
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He also pointed out in this letter that it would be the United States New Zealand 
would have to look to as a security guarantor. The United Kingdom was simply 
not capable of providing the assurances New Zealand needed. Neither was the 
United Nations an option due to its inability to function effectively. This left only 
the United States. Still it would be "unthinkable" that the United Kingdom would 
not be included in a Pacific Pact, but if for some reason they could not, or would 
not, be involved Berendsen said this should not stop New Zealand being part of 
it.119 
Berendsen was one of the dominant figures in the development of New 
Zealand's external affairs policy at this time and for him to suggest a path that did 
not include the United Kingdom was, if not radical, then a significant step in the 
further development of an independent policy. New Zealand had been making its 
own decisions with reference to external affairs certainly since 1936, however, 
decisions were generally made with 'one eye on London.' Here Berendsen 
suggested that New Zealand may (if the United Kingdom did not become 
involved) have to go it alone. 
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Just who would be in a Pacific Pact became a major issue whenever the 
concept was discussed. Fraser mentioned a Pact that contained New Zealand, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Mexico and some 
Central and South American countries. Later on, the Asian countries were 
included in discussions; the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia were 
variously mentioned. However, to include these countries would have required 
the establishment of a comprehensive pact covering the whole Asia-Pacific 
region. 
An alternative idea for a limited pact, including only a few nations - New 
Zealand, Australia, The United States, and the United Kingdom, with possibly 
Japan, the Philippines and Canada was proposed. 
Notwithstanding the issue of membership, consensus was evident on the form 
of any treaty. It would be similar to the newly formed Atlantic Pact, that is 
mutually defensive in nature. If one country was to come under attack, the other 
members of the pact would be obliged to come to the aid of that country. 
Incredibly the Chiefs of Staff in New Zealand were still not particularly 
interested in any alliance which included New Zealand and the United States. 
Their view was that the role of the New Zealand military was to provide forces for 
the Middle East 'in the case of a Third World War.' It was here they felt New 
119 ibid 
Zealand could make its most significant contribution in the fight against 
communism. On April 28 1950, they wrote to Macintosh: 
The outstanding feature of the strategic situation in the Pacific is the 
strength of United States sea power. Unless and until the United States 
position is successfully challenged neither the Soviet Union nor any 
Russian satellite can undertake military operations outside the 
continental limits of Asia. There is, thus, no direct threat to New 
Zealand. [emphasis added by author] 
... The fate of New Zealand will be determined in such a war by the 
success or failure of allied arms in the vital theatres, i.e., Western 
Europe and the Middle East. The final decision will not be critically 
affected by the turn of events in other areas-e.g., South-East Asia . 
... On military grounds there are at present no reasons for an approach 
by New Zealand to the United States for the conclusion of a Pacific 
Defence Pact. 120 
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As there was no direct threat to this country, and any future Russian or 
Japanese threat would be dealt with by the United States Navy, New Zealand did 
not have to worry about the security situation in the Pacific. It could concentrate 
its defence efforts on preparing to fight in the Middle East and leave its own 
security in the hands of the United States as it had done in 1942. 
The New Zealand military chiefs supported their view by quoting from a British 
military report, which said: 
Should the defence of South-East Asia be gravely threatened by a 
Communist rising, it is possible that assistance to the Allied forces in 
the area might be required. This possibility must not be allowed to 
affect plans to implement the main requirement of assistance in the 
Middle East.121 
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The Middle East was clearly seen as New Zealand's vital theatre, it seems at 
least as much as New Zealand itself! It is important to remember, as was stated 
earlier in their report, the Chiefs of Staff did not believe New Zealand was 
threatened. If a war did break out in Asia it was thought it would be contained to 
the Asian mainland as logistics difficulties (as well as the United States Navy) 
would prevent any far ranging operations over water. 
Still whether they would have supported sending virtually all of the New 
Zealand Army and the RNZAF to the Middle East if an enemy had risen to sweep 
all before it in Asia and was bearing down on the South Pacific is debatable. In 
1942 the New Zealand forces were already in the Middle East and it would have 
been logistically difficult to have them return. However, had Japan started its 
campaign before the New Zealand force left to fight the Germans and Italians it 
would have been extremely unlikely any New Zealand government would have 
sent its forces so far from its shores. 
Neither was the Department of External Affairs keen on a Pacific Pact. They 
shared the same views as the Chiefs of Staff about where New Zealand should 
12° CHIEFS OF STAFF to MCINTOSH, A, memorandum: 28 April 1950, in KA Y(ed.) volume 
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be concentrating its military focus and held other reservations that a 
comprehensive Pacific Pact was not in New Zealand's interests. These reasons 
were given as: 122 
• Though New Zealand, Australia and the United States had a great deal in 
common this was not the case with their relations with the Asian nations, or 
between these nations themselves 
• New Zealand could not trust the Asian nations. New Zealand and Australia 
might see the Asian countries strengthened economically and militarily as a 
result of the Pact and then find these Asian countries 'changing sides' and 
becoming potential enemies. It was also felt that the Asian nations could not be 
relied on. 
• New Zealand would be over-stretched to meet military commitments to the 
region and the Middle East. 
• Using New Zealand military forces in this region would be a waste of military 
effort when they would be needed elsewhere. 
The idea of fighting on behalf of Asian countries, considered to be unreliable, 
corrupt and even potential foes was not considered to be of any benefit to New 
121 ibid. p.537 
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Zealand. It was very doubtful that any Asian country could contribute anything to 
the defence of New Zealand. They were backward militarily; and if a threat did 
emerge to New Zealand most would have already come under the influence of 
the threat and hence not be in a position to help .. 
A limited Pact, (which it was envisaged by the United States would include New 
Zealand, Australia, United States, United Kingdom, Japan and the Philippines) 
would not be acceptable as this would entail military and political relations with 
Japan. As noted later in the Report on the Australian-New Zealand consultations 
with Dulles at Canberra from 15 to 18 February 1951: it would: 
"be highly unacceptable to the New Zealand public. Moreover, It would 
be difficult to be party to a collective obligation to defend Japan and at 
the same time secure the primary objective of a guarantee against the 
possibility of Japanese Aggression.123 
The External Affairs Department suggested the best option available to New 
Zealand was to pursue an informal United States security guarantee. 124 It was 
considered it was inconceivable that the United States would fail to come to the 
aid of New Zealand and Australia if a threat emerged, particularly if New Zealand 
was fighting elsewhere. 
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The United Kingdom was not keen on the idea of a Pacific Pact either. When 
the Australian Minster for External Affairs Percy Spender travelled to the United 
States on board the Queen Mary (leaving Southampton on 7 September 1950) 
he discussed the idea of a Pacific Pact with the United Kingdom's Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin who was also travelling. Despite Spender explaining that 
a pact was very important to Australia (and New Zealand), Bevin said that the 
United Kingdom did not favour the idea at all saying that it needed to include 
Asia, which was impossible without India otherwise it would be a 'white mans 
pact.'125 As Spender later wrote in Exercises in Diplomacy. 
I felt when I left Bevin's stateroom that despite the warm personal 
hearing he accorded me, I had failed ... to penetrate the U.K. 
indifference, if not opposition, to the idea [of a Pacific Pact].126 
The ANZUS Pact 
In contrast to the rather 'luke-warm' response by the Chiefs of Staff, and his 
own Ministry, the Minister for External Affairs was enthusiastic about the idea of a 
Pacific Pact that included the United States. Writing to Berendsen on 9 May 
1950 he said: 
125 SPENDER, P. Exercises in Diplomacy: the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan, Sydney 
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.... lfthere was any possibility of having a limited Pact. .. I would be 
happy to consider it, as I regard an American guarantee of our security 
as the richest prize of New Zealand diplomacy.127 
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Later the same day Doidge released a statement to the press saying that the 
security of both New Zealand and Australia could not be assured without the 
establishment of a Pacific Pact along the same lines of the Atlantic Pact. He also 
stated that such a Pact would have to include not only New Zealand, Australia 
and the United States but also the United Kingdom, Canada and India for it to be 
effective. 128 How India was to be a member of a Pacific Pact is not clear and it 
appears that Doidge's reference to it was more a reflection of his strong feelings 
toward a united British Commonwealth than any practical rationale. 
Doidge was not as confident as his military chiefs on the lack of threat to New 
Zealand. Earlier in 1949 while in opposition, he told the House that: 
The gravest danger spot in the world to-day is not Germany, not 
Western Europe, but south-east Asia .... [A]nd south-east Asia is an 
area bordered by ... Australia and New Zealand in the east.129 
New Zealand and Australia were very concerned about the possibility of a 
rearmed Japan. Memories of the earlier threat posed by Japan were still fresh in 
the minds of most New Zealanders and parallels (somewhat inaccurately) with 
the resurgence of Germany after the First World War were made. If Germany 
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could rise after being defeated in 1918, Japan could then rise again after the end 
of Second World War. As such it was necessary to impose a 'hard' final 
settlement should be forced on Japan. This ignored the fact that it was the very 
harsh settlement imposed upon Germany after the First World War probably 
more than any other factor that lead to the rise of the Nazis in Germany. New 
Zealand and Australia felt Japan should be prevented from having the ability to 
threaten its neighbours again, for if given the chance again it would surely take it 
and they felt that a strict post war conditions would prevent this from happening. 
The United States however were more concerned over the communist threat in 
the Asian region. On 30 December 1949 the United States produced NSC 48/2: 
The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia. It stated that some of the 
prime United States objectives in the region were: 
b. Development of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist 
nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further 
encroachment by communism. 
c. Gradual reduction and eventual elimination of the preponderant 
power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the 
Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the 
security of the United States or Its friends and that the Soviet Union 
would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten peace, 
a national independence and stability of the Asiatic [sic] nations.130 
Included in the recommendations set out in NSC48/2 to achieve these goals 
was: 
Active consideration should be given to means by which all members of 
the British Commonwealth may be induced to play a more active role in 
collaboration with the United States in Asia. 131 
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This concern about the spread of communism through Asia was reflected in the 
United States approach to Japan. There was concern that unless a Peace 
Treaty was put in place, Japan would become vulnerable to Communism. The 
United States 'Ambassador at Large,' Jessup, wrote to Acheson saying it was 
important that there should be: 
Rapid steps towards a peace conference [sic], with or without the 
Soviets, and conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty, with or without 
agreement of all interested powers ... 132 
However, there was debate in the United States on what form a Peace Treaty 
should take. The State Department wanted Japan to become aligned with the 
West, while the military wanted Japan to become a democratic, neutral and 
unarmed state. There was, however, concern expressed by both New Zealand 
and Australia about any possible peace treaty. 
New Zealand and Australia could understand the United States' concerns over 
a possible communist take over of Japan, (either by force or persuasion), 
however, they remained firm in the belief that future Japanese aggression was 
130 DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Foreign Relations of the United States: volume VII 1949, East 
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the greatest potential threat to their security. If the United States could provide 
New Zealand and Australia with a security guarantee they would be prepared to 
support the peace treaty that could include a provision for the rearming of Japan. 
If an American security guarantee was not forthcoming to prevent any future 
Japanese expansion, neither New Zealand or Australia was prepared to support 
any conclusion to the peace treaty. The depth of feeling in New Zealand and 
Australia on the matter is illustrated by David McIntyre in Background to the 
ANZUS Pact when he describes a meeting between Dulles and Spender on 22 
September 1950: 
When he spoke with Spender and David McNicol (of the Australian 
Embassy), Dulles stressed the need to deny Japan's resources to the 
Soviet Union and at the same time avoid Japanese resentment. Allison 
[Head of the Northeast Asia Affairs division at the State Department] 
later wrote a graphic description of Spender's reaction. He thought 
Spender was 'going to have apoplexy'. 'Sir Percy ... is a rather short, 
reddish-haired man with a florid complexion. As he read [the US] 
memorandum [on the Japanese Peace Treaty] his face grew more and 
more suffused with color, and at one point I thought he would burst a 
blood vessel.' He recalled that Spender 'did not hesitate to express his 
opinion in colorful and uninhibited language.' The Australian bluntly 
reminded Dulles of his country's fears of a Japanese resurgence. He 
said that Australia would not support the peace treaty unless it was 
assured of its own security. 133 
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Other reasons, apart from a concern about Japanese expansion, were also 
behind the desire for a security guarantee. It was thought an American security 
guarantee would help the New Zealand commitment to the Middle East rather 
than hinder it. The spread of communism, while worrying to New Zealand, was 
at this stage at least, of far less concern than a strong Japan. New Zealand was 
preparing to face communism, albeit this was to be in the Middle East and not in 
the Pacific. A security guarantee by the Americans would satisfy both of these 
concerns. 
Apart from protecting New Zealand from Japan, a Pacific Pact would also 
provide for the security of New Zealand in the unlikely event of a communist 
threat arising while New Zealand had its military forces in the Middle East. An 
American guarantee would 'close the back door' so to speak. It would allow New 
Zealand to concentrate on the Middle East, free from the worry of a direct threat 
to the New Zealand mainland, as was the case in 1942. 
The Australians gave another reason for the tripartite treaty. As they, (and 
New Zealand) were prepared to make contributions to stopping the world-wide 
spread of communism they should have a voice in global strategy. As things 
stood at this time they were underpinning the North Atlantic Treaty by readying 
forces to fight, but still they had no real voice on international security. A Pacific 
treaty would provide the forum for Australia and New Zealand to have their 
voices heard. 
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The idea of a trilateral agreement was beginning to find support in Washington. 
On October 9 1950 Dean Rusk134 wrote to Elbert Mathews 135: 
There appears to be merit ... in tightening our relationships with Australia 
and New Zealand. The cooperation and support of these countries will 
be of increasing importance to us during the coming year as we face 
the peculiarly difficult problems of the post-hostilities security and 
reconstruction of Korea and the negotiation of a Japanese peace treaty. 
Therefore, rr by trilateral agreement, the desires of Australia [and New 
Zealand] for some closer relationship can be met, it would appear to be 
likewise in our interest to proceed toward this objective.136 
The attitude of the United States towards New Zealand at this time was 
summed up in a United States policy document toward New Zealand released by 
the State Department on 30 July, 1951. Although this was eight months after 
Rusk's above statement, it does explain the United States attitude at the time. 
There was an appreciation that: 
In international affairs New Zealand often follows British or Australian 
leadership: but it should not be forgotten that New Zealand is an 
independent country which appreciates being approached directly and 
that it occasionally resents the aggressive assertion of leadership by 
Australia.137 
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The nature of the United States/New Zealand relationship and the importance 
of it to the United States was summed up thus: 
Our relations with New Zealand have always been most friendly and 
there has been very little discord in our relations, either political or 
economic. To the extent that we continue our present close 
cooperation with the United Kingdom we can be assured of a generally 
sympathetic attitude on the part of the New Zealand Government and 
public opinion. On the other hand New Zealand support for US policies, 
particularly in the Far East, can be of great value in obtaining support 
within the Commonwealth for our objectives and policies. 
There continues to be some fear in New Zealand that in building up 
Japan we are paying insufficient attention to the security considerations 
which are paramount in New Zealand's attitude toward the 
reconstruction of Japan. These fears would be allayed in large 
measure by the proposed Pacific security arrangement. New Zealand 
support for the Japanese peace treaty we believe necessary in the light 
of present circumstances would also have some bearing on United 
Kingdom and Australian attitudes toward this question. 
New Zealand and the United States share a common western 
European tradition, the heritage of the English common law and a 
distaste for arbitrary power and violent change. The national interests 
of our two countries in safeguarding and preserving the principles of 
democratic government are fundamentally the same. This means that 
in any issue involving a matter of principle New Zealand's reactions are 
apt to parallel those of the US. New Zealand can be of assistance to 
us in UN affairs and in Far Eastern problems generally.138 
New Zealand's traditional security partner, the United Kingdom, was also 
beginning to resist the idea of New Zealand (and Australia) being part of a Pacific 
Pact which did not include them. They were of the understanding (from 
discussions they had had with the United States) that they would only be a 
'consultant' and not an active member of any Pacific pact. 
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This would be an embarrassment to the United Kingdom particularly as they 
still considered themselves a world power. To be left out of a Pacific pact would 
imply to the rest of the world they were not. The United Kingdom still had 
interests in the region (Malaya. Singapore, Hong Kong, Borneo) and to be left out 
of a Pacific pact would, in the view of the United Kingdom, diminish its standing 
with these countries. The prospect of New Zealand and Australia, two nations 
with very close historic and cultural links with the United Kingdom being part of 
an arrangement without them would further reinforce the feeling of 
embarrassment. 
The United Kingdom's High Commissioner wrote to Shanahan (who was acting 
head of the External Affairs Department) expressing the views of his government: 
The United Kingdom authorities, ... as present advised, ... would not 
favour the idea of a Pacific defence organisation which excluded the 
United Kingdom 139 
The United Kingdom's attitude towards a Pacific Pact, particularly one that did 
not include them, was beginning to annoy the Australian government. The New 
Zealand High Commission in Canberra wrote to Shanahan on February 5 1951 
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advising that Australia felt the United Kingdom would complicate matters and 
make it harder for Australian and New Zealand to achieve a desirable outcome 
with the United States. New Zealand replied the next day that they felt (at this 
stage) the United Kingdom involvement was welcome and was not causing any 
problems. The United Kingdom was seen as having considerable experience in 
these types of matters and their advice would be useful. 
However, when the United Kingdom informed Doidge of its views, Prime 
Minister Holland was in Washington for talks with the United States leadership. It 
was during a meeting on 8 February that Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
suggested a tripartite security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States. 
Holland informed the Americans of New Zealand's reasons for seeking a 
security guarantee, as he recalled in a letter to Doidge after the meeting: 
I made the point that we in New Zealand sought an American guarantee 
of security for two reasons: first, because our people fear the 
resurgence of Japanese militarism. They would not willingly accept a 
peace treaty with Japan which contained no safeguards against 
Japanese rearmament. ... The second reason was that we wished to 
fulfil our obligations to send troops and airforces to the Middle East as 
part of our contribution in the event of war.140 
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At the end of the meeting the idea of a pact containing New Zealand, Australia 
and the United States was proposed by the United States, as Holland told 
Doidge: 
Toward the end of the discussion he [Rusk) himself volunteered the 
proposal that consideration might be given to a tripartite arrangement, 
namely the United States, Australia and New Zealand. From our point 
of view this seems by far the best solution and I would urge that 
Spender and you endeavour to carry this proposal further141 
When Holland urged Doidge that he and Spender should push the idea of a 
tripartite treaty he was referring to a series of meetings to be held in Canberra on 
15-18 February 1951. 
This was a major 'breakthrough' in the formation of a Pacific Pact as the main 
stumbling block of membership had apparently been resolved. New Zealand did 
not want to include the Asian nations and this option offered by Rusk solved this 
problem. Such a pact would allow New Zealand to concentrate its military efforts 
in the Middle East while being secure in the knowledge that any threat to home 
shores would be met by the United States. 
The tripartite arrangement allayed any concerns the External Affairs 
Department had about New Zealand being tied to other nations in Asia and they 
fully supported the policy of pursuing such an agreement. The military had their 
141 ibid 
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way as well as this would complement New Zealand's Middle East commitment 
rather than draw resources from it. 
Simultaneously with Holland's telegram to Doidge covering the Rusk meeting 
and instructing his Minister to push for the tripartite pact, the United Kingdom 
High Commissioner in Wellington presented his Governments views on the 
security arrangements in the Pacific. The British government was clearly against 
the idea of a Pacific pact. The reasons were given as: 
• New Zealand would not be able to fully fulfil its military commitments to the 
Middle East in time of war 
• Such a Pact would not prevent Japan from rearming and becoming a threat to 
New Zealand again. 
• The prestige and commitment of the United Kingdom to the region would 
come into question if it was not part of the Pact 
• The Pact could be viewed as a 'white man's pact,' which may generate 
problems when dealing with India, Pakistan and Ceylon. 
• The exclusion of the South Pacific Islands (such as Fiji) would cause 
complications. 
Such was the United Kingdom's concern that the pressure continued to be 
applied. The letter went on to say that: 
... any arrangement in which the United Kingdom was not a full 
participant might give rise to suspicions that it might be hard to dispel of 
some rift in policy between the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The United Kingdom Government think that the New Zealand 
Government will themselves share their views as to many of the 
difficulties outlined ... - difficulties which appear to affect the interests of 
New Zealand equally with those of the United Kingdom - and will feel 
that, in the forthcoming discussions, the approach to the proposals 
should be a cautious one so that there may be full opportunity of further 
consultation between the New Zealand, Australian and United Kingdom 
governments before any decisions are reached.142 
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Obviously a number of the objections raised by the United Kingdom did not 
apply to the tripartite pact (if it could be agreed upon) as Japan was not to be part 
of it and therefore there was no requirement for New Zealand to fight in their 
defence. An American security guarantee would also provide a defence against 
any future Japanese aggression. In terms of New Zealand's commitment to the 
Middle East, and contrary to the United Kingdom's views, a pact would free up 
military resources as New Zealand would not have to worry about a direct attack 
in the south Pacific. 
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Nonetheless, there were some objections that would still hold if New Zealand 
entered into a limited pact with only Australia and the United States. New 
Zealand, were it to press ahead with a Pacific Pact, would do so against the 
wishes of the United Kingdom. 
Ten days later on the 15 February, Spender, Dulles and Doidge meet in 
Canberra for a series of talks. During the discussions New Zealand and 
Australia continued to push for an American security guarantee as a condition for 
supporting a Japanese peace treaty. 
Prior to attending the talks Holland sent Doidge a telegram detailing why a 
Pacific pact was important to New Zealand. In it he stated: 
"I am thinking of our obligations in the Middle East and we must be 
careful that our enthusiasm for a Pacific pact does not lead us into 
obligations that would conflict with those we undertook to fulfil in the 
Middle East. We cannot do both. The point I have put forward to Mr 
Acheson is that so long as New Zealand is making its maximum effort in 
some approved theatre, then we should, in return, qualify for defensive 
protection by the United States. Without such an assurance we would 
be obliged to reduce our Middle East commitments so as to man our 
home defences as best we could. Mr. Acheson said he agreed that this 
reasoning was entirely sound.143 
This statement is extremely important as it clearly shows the New Zealand 
Government thinking on the reality of the relationship with the United Kingdom. 
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Holland was acknowledging that it was the United States, not the United 
Kingdom, upon which New Zealand's defence relied. More importantly though it 
shows that New Zealand was not willing to sacrifice the defence of New Zealand 
on an altar of Commonwealth loyalty. New Zealand, if threatened, would not 
send its troops to fight in the Middle East unless other assurances for home 
security were in place. Yet this was still against the wishes of both the New 
Zealand military and the United Kingdom. The Chiefs of Staff said in their report 
of 28 April that New Zealand should concentrate on the Middle East believing this 
to be more important to New Zealand's security than South-East Asia. 
During the discussions the United States continued to emphasise their belief 
that the Japanese Peace Treaty was vitally important in preventing the further 
spread of communism and the possible destabilisation of the region. Both New 
Zealand and Australia agreed, but continued to state this was not reason enough 
for their acceptance of the treaty. An American security guarantee, preferably as 
part of tripartite security pact, would be necessary for New Zealand and 
Australia's support for the peace treaty. 
By the time the talks ended on the 17 February, both achieved their objectives. 
New Zealand and Australia would support the Japanese Peace Treaty and the 
United States would agree to a tripartite security treaty with the United States -
ANZUS. One point of concern remained however- the position of the Philippines. 
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The United States wanted it included in any Pacific security arrangement, due to 
the close relationship between the two, but neither New Zealand nor Australia 
favoured inclusion. Still if this was to be the price of obtaining a security treaty, 
both were actually prepared to pay. 
At this stage a draft document was produced although it was far from certain 
that a treaty would result. The draft would have to be cleared by the respective 
governments, and though this would not be a problem for New Zealand and 
Australia there was the possibility the United States Congress would not support 
it. 
The United Kingdom did not support the treaty and continued to apply pressure 
on its perspective participants to have it stopped. New Zealand's High 
Commissioner in Canberra wrote to Doidge on the matter on 12 March: 
[The] Department of External Affairs are most concerned at a lack of a 
reply from London to their request for United Kingdom Government's 
comments on security pact proposals and it appears to be their belief 
that a reply is being withheld until such time as United Kingdom have 
done their utmost to persuade Americans to switch from a pact to 
something in nature of a presidential declaration.144 
The United Kingdom did contact Holland on the 16 March concerning the 
formation of the Pacific pact. They were not against the idea of a tripartite pact 
February 1951, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.594 
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but were strongly opposed to the inclusion of the Philippines. As Patrick 
Walker145 stated: 
Our ... anxiety is that in view of the United Kingdom's essential interest in 
the Pacific arising from her Commonwealth connections as well as her 
territorial possessions there the treaty in its present form might be read 
as implying that the United Kingdom was renouncing its proper share of 
responsibility in the area. Again it might give the impression that the 
Untted Kingdom was being unduly subservient to the United States in 
the Pacific, which, at a time when public opinion in the Untted Kingdom 
is particularly sensitive on this point in relation to naval appointments in 
the Atlantic, would not be in the best interests of Anglo-American 
relations. Indeed neither of these impressions would be helpful to our 
common cause, which is why I feel justified in speaking to you so 
frankly on the subject. Both these impressions would be strengthened 
if, while the United Kingdom did not participate in the treaty, the 
Philippines were permitted to do so.146 
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It seems the United Kingdom was less concerned with the prospect of a pact, 
as long as it did not include the Philippines and it would not oppose a pact if this 
was the case. However it would be fair to say that neither were they happy with 
the prospect, asking that: 
When time com es we vyould of course wish to state publicly the attitude 
of the Untted Kingdom Government welcoming the treaty and making it 
clear that we had been consulted throughout. It would help us greatly if 
both our governments and the Australian Government also were to 
make concerted statements laying emphasis on the value of the treaty 
as a contribution towards Commonwealth security and as a 
reinforcement of the vital interests of the United Kingdom, Australia and 
145 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 
146 WALKER, P. to HOLLAND, S. telegram: 16 March 1951, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.660 
New Zealand in the whole of the Pacific area: and stating that our three 
governments regard the pact as complementary to the mutual support 
and co-operation between our three countries which have always been 
so essential part of our relationship.147 
From this both New Zealand and Australia took the view that the United 
Kingdom would not stand in the way of a tripartite treaty: Menzies wrote to 
Holland on the 16 March 148 that: 
As I interpret United Kingdom Government's attitude, they now 
accept, ... a tripartite arrangement between the United States, New 
Zealand and Australia. This is notable step forward. On the other hand 
they are quite opposed to the inclusion of the Philippines in a 
quadripartite pact of a similar nature.149 
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Neither New Zealand or Australia welcomed the idea that the Philippines would 
be included in any security arrangement with the United States. However both 
sides were prepared to accept their inclusion if that was what was needed to get 
Washington to enter into a pact. 
The British attitude toward the Philippines inclusion though would threaten 
Wellington and Canberra's efforts in obtaining a security arrangement. Rather 
than simply push for the non-inclusion of the Philippines, London tried to derail 
the whole thing. This annoyed both the New Zealanders and the Australians. 
New Zealand was not prepared to accept the British view and forego the treaty 
147 ibid. pp.659-60 
148 Australia received the telegram from Walker a day earlier than New Zealand 
149 MENZIES, R. to HOLLAND, S. telegram: 16 March 1951, in KAY(ed.) volume three, p.660 
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because of United Kingdom concerns at how it would be perceived at home or by 
other nations in the region. McIntosh wrote to Berendsen on 16 March being 
very blunt about the British actions: 
The British obviously are doing their best to torpedo the whole thing.
150 
To, which Berendsen replied on 2 April: 
... I have read with great interest, and of course complete 
understanding, of your exasperation with the British efforts. We are all 
convinced here that they are really doing their best to torpedo the whole 
thing as you say and they may very well succeed in doing it. It will want 
very careful watching and might require some very plain speaking · 
indeed. It is not perhaps without significance that we get practically 
nothing at all from the British Embassy as to what they are doing, 
though they are and have been in frequent touch with the State 
Department on this matter151 
The New Zealand Cabinet was well aware a treaty would have a major impact 
on New Zealand's external relations, particularly with reference to the United 
Kingdom. It was noted that Clifton Webb 152: 
... was not without misgivings regarding the arrangement. If we made 
this treaty with the United States of America we could no longer "pound 
the table on the matter of Imperial preference"; furthermore, it would 
admit important psychological changes in our attitude to the United 
150 MCINTOSH, A. to BERENDSEN, C. letter: 16 March 1951, in MCGIBBON, I. Undiplomatic 
Dialogue, p.255 
151 BERENDSEN, C. to MCINTOSH, A. letter: 2 April 1951, ibid, p.256-257 
152 Attorney-General and Minister of Justice 
Kingdom. It was very important that we appreciate this and the 
implications of the treaty.
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At the end of the discussion Doidge stated his, and the Prime Minister's, 
position: 
Mr Doidge ... emphasizing that while there was difficulties to which the 
Ministers had referred, It was neverless of supreme importance to New 
Zealand that we obtain a guarantee of our security from the United 
States of America. The United Kingdom no longer had the strength to 
protect us: "Britannia no longer ruled the waves". It was vital to get a 
United States guarantee and, given all the objections, it was even more 
important that we accept the proposed treaty. 154 
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Still New Zealand and Australia continued to push the United States not to 
include the Philippines in the final draft of the treaty. Neither trusted the latter 
and could see no benefit to its inclusion. Both urged the United States to arrange 
a separate agreement with the Philippines to resolve the issue. This would also 
mollify the United Kingdom who remained adamant the Philippines should not be 
included. While seeking an alternative, both remained prepared to resist the 
wishes of the United Kingdom to obtain what they wanted from the United States. 
The United States informed Berendsen on 13 April they understood the New 
Zealand, Australian and British attitude towards the Philippines and hoped after 
discussions with the latter they would be able to offer New Zealand and Australia 
153 NEW ZEALAND CABINET, Note ofa Cabinet Discussion on 22 March 1951, in KAY(ed.) 
volume three, p.673 
154 ibid. p.674 
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a tripartite treaty. This they did and on the 18 April, President Truman issued a 
statement concerning Pacific security in which he said: 
The Governments of Australia and New Zealand, in connection with the 
re-establishment of peace with Japan, have suggested an arrangement 
between them and the United States, pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of 
the United Nations Charter, which would make clear in the event of an 
armed attack upon any one of them in the Pacific, each of the three 
would actto meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, and which would establish consultation to 
strengthen security on the basis of continuous and effective self-help 
and mutual aid. 
"The possibilities of such an arrangement were fully explorf:)d by Mr 
Dulles at Canberra, Australia, and Wellington, New Zealand, and have 
been informally discussed with the appropriate sub-committees of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House. 
"I have now asked the Secretary of State [Acheson], the Secretary of 
Defence [Marshall] and Mr Dulles ... to pursue this matter further 
concurrently with the prosecution of the other negotiations necessary to 
bring the Japanese peace settlement to an early and satisfactory 
conclusion .155 
New Zealand and Australia publicly welcomed Truman's statement and over 
the next three months the text of the treaty was negotiated. 
On the 13 April Doidge presented to the House a draft treaty between New 
Zealand, Australia and the United States for approval. It was hoped that subject 
155 BERENDS EN, C. to DOIDGE, F. Text of President Truman's statement of 18 April 1951: letter 
18 April 1951, in KA Y(ed.) volume three, p.701 
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to the other countries also ratifying the agreement it could be signed later in the 
year. This occurred and on 1 September 1951, the Security Treaty between 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States was signed by all parties at San 
Francisco. Eight days later The Treaty of Peace with Japan was also signed. 
Conclusion 
The signing of the ANZUS treaty was a major achievement for New Zealand 
external relations. It clearly shows that New Zealand followed a policy which it 
had decided to embark on independently from any other nation (though in 
collaboration with Australia and later on the United States). It continued to push 
ahead with its goal of achieving a security arrangement despite initial United 
States reluctance and British opposition to the idea. 
This was in stark contrast to New Zealand's previous dealings with the United 
States. As discussed earlier in this thesis, despite New Zealand's contribution to 
the war effort and its commitment to the BCOF the United States had effectively 
ignored New Zealand and other contributors and acted according to its own 
interests only following the surrender and occupation of Japan. However, the 
war in Korea, and the United States desire to quickly wrap up a Japanese Peace 
Treaty, enabled New Zealand and Australia to exert some degree of pressure on 
the United States. There could not be a comprehensive peace treaty unless all 
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the participants in the war concurred. By using this New Zealand and Australia 
managed to extract an important concession, the ANZUS Pact, from the United 
States. 
The ANZUS Pact was also an acknowledgement that the United Kingdom 
could no longer be relied upon to provide for the security of New Zealand. Were 
a future threat to arise from Japan, or communism, it would be the United States 
that New Zealand would need to rely upon. The United Kingdom, believing 
Europe and the Middle East as the crucial theatres of a future war were obliged 
to concentrated its resource there and could not guarantee their availability to 
fight in the Pacific as well. 
There was no direct threat to New Zealand at this time. This was the opinion of 
both the Chiefs of Staff and the Department of External Affairs. There was, 
however, a possibility that were Japan allowed to rearm under a peace treaty it 
could again pose a threat to New Zealand. This was the driving force behind 
New Zealand and Australia's desire for a security arrangement with the United 
States. 
Prior to ANZUS New Zealand had based its security policy upon the 
capabilities of the United Kingdom in the belief this would best serve New 
Zealand's interests. With the signing of the ANZUS Pact, however, New Zealand 
moved the basis of its security policy away from the United Kingdom towards the 
.. 
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United States. New Zealand was still committed to the ideal of Commonwealth 
security and was even prepared to fight in the Middle East if a 'Third World War' 
started, but, as Holland pointed out in his telegram of 7 February 1951, only if the 
United States would guarantee New Zealand's security. Without this guarantee 
New Zealand would not be able to fulfil its Middle East commitments. 
The New Zealand policy of pursuing an American security guarantee also 
placed it in a position counter to that of the United Kingdom. There was concern 
in London over the form such a guarantee would take and the implications for 
them of any such initiative. Consequently they were against the idea of a Pacific 
Pact. 
The United Kingdom, despite concentrating its efforts on the new Atlantic Pact, 
was concerned it would 'lose face' if a Pacific Pact was concluded. It would be 
further evidence the United Kingdom was no longer the world power it had once 
been. The idea of a pact between Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
that did not include them was barely acceptable and though they were not keen 
on it, they would not actively oppose it. However the possible inclusion of the 
Philippines in any security arrangement was unacceptable to London and as a 
result they were prepared to stonewall any pact, even if this was against the 
interests of both New Zealand and Australia. 
However, both New Zealand and Australia forged ahead and achieved what 
they believed was vital to their national interest. This clearly shows that New 
Zealand was an independent nation, not merely a British outpost in the South 
Pacific, and was prepared to act accordingly. 
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Ironically it was a staunch anglophile Prime Minister Holland and his 
government adopted this policy. Holland, who had described himself as 
"Britisher through and through" had placed New Zealand's interests ahead of 
those of the 'Mother Country' by continuing to push for a pact. He pursued a 
major policy development (i.e. the ANZUS Pact) in external affairs in isolation 
from New Zealand's traditional security partner, the United Kingdom. As a long 
term consequence New Zealand had re-orientated its security affairs. 
Nonetheless, and in the short term, New Zealand saw the pact as 
complementary to Commonwealth arrangements by 'closing the back door' and 
allowing it to concentrate on its Commonwealth commitments in the Middle East. 
This commitment was, however, now dependant on New Zealand's own security 
concerns and as the United Kingdom could not allay these, Wellington would 
look towards the United States to meet its security needs. As such, the United 
States became more important to New Zealand in security and defence than the 
United Kingdom. 
Yet again the actions by New Zealand clearly followed Vital's 'active' policy 
framework in that New Zealand attempted to, and succeeded in altering its 
external relations with a much larger nation. New Zealand, a small and 
independent state wanted a security undertaking from the United States and 
received it by withholding its support for the Japanese Peace Treaty. 
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Had New Zealand simply signed off on the peace treaty without obtaining its 
needs, this would have followed the 'passive' course of action. But it clearly did 
not. New Zealand did not accept it was too small to influence the United States 
and along with Australia it succeeded in its aims. 
In terms of the hypotheses, both were shown to be valid in this case study. 
H1 That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when 
deciding its external affairs policy 
New Zealand, with Australia, wanted a security guarantee (which later became 
a desire for a formal treaty) from the United States as a condition for agreeing to 
the Japanese Peace Treaty. This policy was decided upon in Wellington (and 
Canberra) and not another country. Indeed, it took some effort to bring the 
United States around to the New Zealand/Australia view. The United Kingdom 
was against the idea of a Pacific Pact and actively opposed it. Notwithstanding, 
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New Zealand continued to press the United States for the pact even when it was 
aware of the United Kingdom's opposition to it. 
H2 New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not 
another country. 
Again this was clearly the case. New Zealand wanted an American 
undertaking for its own security. New Zealand saw it as 'the richest prize' in its 
external affairs and of benefit to New Zealand. It had with this arrangement 
made New Zealand 'safe' from any future threats through the protection of the 
United States. 
H3 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relations 
goals. 
New Zealand clearly achieved its goal with the formation of the ANZUS Treaty. 
New Zealand was concerned with the prospect of a rearmed Japan and would 
not agree to any final settlement with Japan unless its concerns were allayed. 
These concerns were addressed and accordingly the hypothesis was shown to 
be valid. 
The ANZUS Treaty was the turning point in New Zealand's post war security 
direction. The United Kingdom and Commonwealth defence would still hold an 
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important place in New Zealand's external affairs, but this would diminish as the 
relationship with the United States grew. The latter relationship continued to 
strengthen and within fifteen years would become the dominant feature of New 




This thesis has argued that for the period commencing with the outbreak of the 
Pacific War (1942) through to the signing of the ANZUS Pact (1952) New 
Zealand acted independently of other nations on important national issues. As a 
small nation New Zealand was dealing with other countries, particularly the 
United Kingdom and the United States, which were larger and more powerful in 
all respects. Despite this, New Zealand forged ahead with objectives that 
satisfied its interests, and attempted to persuade the larger nations to be 
cognizant and supportive of these. 
In the course of this thesis, the following hypotheses were examined: 
• H1 That New Zealand acted independently of any other country when 
deciding its external affairs policy. 
• H2 That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first and not 
another country. 
• H2 That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external relation 
goals. 
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In order to examine these hypotheses, this thesis studied two important 
external affairs initiatives: the first being New Zealand's involvement in the 
surrender and occupation of Japan; the second being the formulation of the 
ANZUS Pact. While studying these initiatives this thesis focused on answering 
the following questions: 
• Was New Zealand acting independently when it decided upon its course of 
action? 
• Was New Zealand making decisions in New Zealand's interests or those of · 
other nations? 
• What was New Zealand hoping to achieve with this policy? 
• Was New Zealand successful in obtaining its goals with its policy? 
The election of the first Labour Government in 1935 signalled a change of 
emphasis in New Zealand's external relations. This did not result in a radical 
change in direction, but there was a difference in the way that such policy came 
about. 
Until 1935, New Zealand had been content to follow the lead of the United 
Kingdom in external affairs. New Zealand was a loyal member of the British 
Empire; effectively a part of the United Kingdom tucked away in the South 
Pacific. The scope of New Zealand's relations overseas was very limited at this 
time. In reality, New Zealand's external relations consisted of following London 
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as well as trading with United Kingdom and to a small degree other countries of 
the Empire. 
With the coming to power of Labour in 1935 New Zealand began to express its 
own voice in the international area. The League of Nations, of which Labour had 
been a vocal supporter while in opposition, was hoped to offer a forum to achieve 
this. Labour believed that the League's ideals of collective security would result in 
a more just world without war. 
The new government's socialist views were in stark contrast to the 
conservative administration in London at the time. This coupled with a different 
interpretation of the Westminster Act contributed to New Zealand's desire to have 
its own international voice, particularly as policies emerging from Westminster 
became out of step with its own. This was borne out with New Zealand's refusal 
to support the United Kingdom's proposal to solve the Italian invasion of 
Abyssinia. New Zealand saw the solution forwarded by the United Kingdom as 
acceding to aggression by a large power. 
There were also differences over policy with respect to Spain. Whereas the 
United Kingdom viewed the civil war as a domestic issue, and hence not a matter 
for the League, New Zealand was of the view that because the fascist rebellion 
was supported by Italy and Germany there were ample reasons for the League to 
get involved. 
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With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 New Zealand 
continued to align itself with the United Kingdom and without hesitation 
despatched disproportionate numbers of seNice personnel (for its size) to fight in 
the northern Hemisphere. However, unlike the war of 1914-18, New Zealand 
was not willing to accept the United Kingdom declaring war on its behalf. Though 
it would be inconceivable at the time not for Wellington to align itself along side 
London given the nature of the relationship between the two countries, New 
Zealand considered itself as an independent nation and as such declared war 
itself. New Zealand also for the duration of the war retained greater control over 
its armed forces than it had during either the Boer or the 1914-18 War. 
The war and occupation of Japan 
With Japan's entry into the war on 7 December 1941 New Zealand felt 
threatened for the first time in its history. This sense of vulnerability further 
increased with the rapid Japanese advance through Asia and the Pacific through 
the inability of either the United Kingdom or the United States to 'stem the tide.' 
This vulnerability was highlighted as the 2nd New Zealand Division (which was in 
effect the New Zealand Army) was in the Middle East and the majority of RNZAF 
aircrews were in the United Kingdom flying with the RAF against Germany. 
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Despite this New Zealand elected not to relocate its forces from the Northern 
Hemisphere. Wellington decided that such a move would hamper the war effort 
overall and hence would not be in New Zealand's interests. This was a bold yet 
responsible decision. 
This decision was both encouraged and supported by the United Kingdom and 
the United States. However, it is incorrect to suggest they made the decision for 
New Zealand. If New Zealand had been determined to withdraw its forces from 
the Middle East and relocate them in the Pacific there is no evidence to suggest 
that they would have been prevented from doing so. Indeed, the fact that the 
Australians withdrew most of their forces to fight the Japanese suggest that had 
Wellington insisted, it could have done the same. 
Despite the initial Japanese successes by mid 1943 the tide of the war had 
turned in the Pacific. The massive financial and industrial resources of the 
United States, once focused on defeating Japan, ensured it was a question of 
when, not if, the Japanese would be defeated. As the Japanese forces were 
pushed closer and closer to their island home, the allied powers debated the 
future of the defeated enemy. At the Cairo Declaration (1 December 1943), the 
Yalta Agreement (11 February 1945) and the Potsdam Conference (July-August 
1945) the major powers set the framework for the conclusion of the war. 
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New Zealand was not part of either of these meetings and resented not being 
included. This country had been threatened by the Japanese, had contributed to 
the war effort yet were not part of the end of war negotiations. Neither was New 
Zealand to be a party to the Japanese surrender on 14 August 1945. 
The United States initially denied New Zealand the opportunity to be a 
signatory at the formal surrender on the USS Missouri. This decision was 
eventually changed after pressure from the United Kingdom, Australia (who were 
also going to be denied signatory rights) and New Zealand. Following approval 
to be a signatory to the surrender document New Zealand was invited to 
participate in the FEC. The change of heart also coincided with the decision by 
New Zealand to contribute to the military occupation of Japan. 
Two main themes were behind the decision to send military forces to Japan. 
First, there was a desire to see any final settlement with Japan met with New 
Zealand's satisfaction. New Zealand participation in the FEC was also related to 
this. Second, New Zealand desired to keep the Pacific region in the forefront of 
the United Kingdom's post war thinking. 
Concern began to grow in Wellington that the United States would not be 
severe enough on the Japanese. New Zealand did not want Japan to 'rise again' 
as had Germany after the First World War. Japan had posed the first real threat 
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to New Zealand in its history and, understandably, New Zealand did not want this 
happening again. 
However after 1947, this was not the view of the United States. Washington 
believed communism was a far greater threat than any (remote) prospect of a 
rearmed Japan. It was believed a harsh settlement might force Japan into the 
"clutches" of communism. 
New Zealand hoped that through the FEC, and the credibility gained by both 
fighting the Japanese and by being willing to contribute to the occupation, it 
would be in a position to influence the United States. This did not occur and the 
United States basically pursued its own agenda with regard to Japan. Despite 
well intentioned efforts, New Zealand was not large enough to bring any 
meaningful pressure to bear on the United States. As a result New Zealand 
failed in its policy goal of actively influencing the United States to put in place the 
strong peace settlement upon Japan that Wellington had wanted. Instead, 
Washington continued with its policy of implementing a 'soft' treaty. 
The second of New Zealand's goals attempted to keep the Asia-Pacific region 
to the fore in the minds of the government in London. 
After the war the United Kingdom was struggling to maintain its world-wide 
commitments. The war had devastated its economy and there was worry in New 
Zealand this could lead to the United Kingdom moving its forces from the Asia-
Pacific to other areas deemed more vital. 
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By contributing forces to the BCOF New Zealand hoped it would encourage the 
United Kingdom to stay. That is New Zealand could not be seen to shirk its 
responsibilities if it was expecting others to maintain theirs. New Zealand could 
not expect the United Kingdom to stay involved in the region if New Zealand itself 
was unwilling to contribute. 
This policy was initially successful. However within months the strain of world-
wide commitments forced the United Kingdom to markedly reduce its 
commitment to the BCOF. As a result, the New Zealand policy did not achieve 
its goals. The United Kingdom continued to reduce its forces further and 
eventually New Zealand did the same. The manpower shortage in New Zealand, 
the withdrawal of the United Kingdom contingent and the inability to make 
headway with the United States in the FEC led New Zealand to withdraw 
completely from the occupation of Japan. 
New Zealand's involvement in the surrender and occupation of Japan 
highlights the problem a small country can have when dealing with a much larger 
power. Unless New Zealand could 'bring something important to the table' it 
could not bring any meaningful pressure to bear upon the United States. In this 
instance it had very little to offer the United States other than being a 'good 
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international citizen.' In this instance this was insufficient and the policy did not 
work. The United States concern over the threat communism posed ensured 
they pushed ahead with policies which, in their view, would help to limit this 
expansion. As a result any opinion which ran counter to theirs (such as New 
Zealand's) had little chance of success. 
Within two years of the withdrawal from the BCOF, New Zealand found itself 
confronting another major international crisis; the invasion of South Korea. 
However, the government in Wellington had changed after a recent general 
election. 
The National party, under Sydney Holland, came to power at the end of 1949. 
This change in leadership did not impress the members of the fledgling 
Department of External affairs. 
Holland was a 'dyed in the wool' anglophile with very little interest or 
understanding of New Zealand's external relations, while his new External Affairs 
Minister, Doidge, did not have a high standing in Cabinet. However, these two 
men would be in charge during New Zealand's decision to contribute to the 
United Nations effort in Korea and later the formulation of the ANZUS Pact. 
Despite some of Holland's actions and the misgivings by McIntosh this became 
a very successful period in New Zealand's external relations. 
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Following the outbreak of the Korean War, New Zealand was one of the first 
nations to offer help. The manner in which Holland came to this decision 
effectively going along with the United Kingdom may not have been approved by 
his advisors, but it was by no means a bad decision. Circumstances dictated that 
a naval contribution at the early stages of the conflict was the only viable option 
for New Zealand. 
By acting quickly New Zealand had shown its support' of the United Nations, as 
well as the United States which was effectively assuming the responsibility for 
opposing the North Korean action. 
Later, by sending an artillery unit rather than infantry, New Zealand managed to 
serve its interests effectively. They resisted Australian pressure to send an 
infantry battalion as this would have resulted in a higher risk of casualties and 
would have lessened New Zealand's Middle East contribution without altering the 
credence it got for its contribution. 
The Korean War also lead to New Zealand's greatest external affairs 
achievement of the period: the signing of the ANZUS Pact of 1952. 
New Zealand had been moving towards the concept of a security agreement 
with the United States since late 1949. With the decline in power of the United 
Kingdom the possible rearmament of Japan, and a growing menace of 
communism, New Zealand (and Australia) wanted an arrangement with the 
United States to guarantee its own security. 
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The Korean War provided the opportunity as the United States sought to finally 
settle the Japanese Peace Treaty fearing that if it did not act quickly to set up a 
friendly administration in Tokyo, communism would fill the vacuum. However, 
neither New Zealand nor Australia would agree to any final settlement unless 
their security concerns were meet. 
The possible rise of an aggressive Japan was still of concern in both Wellington 
and Canberra. This was understandable given the events of 1941-45, 
particularly the early stages of the Pacific War, where for the first time in its 
history New Zealand had to face the, albeit slight, possibility of invasion. Any 
United States settlement over Japan, would need to allay this concern for it to 
gain New Zealand's approval. 
In contrast to the situation only a few years earlier with the FEC and BCOF, 
New Zealand now had something with which it could bargain. Washington 
needed New Zealand's support for two reasons. First they needed as many 
countries as possible to support their initiative and second they expected New 
Zealand's concurrence would help other Commonwealth countries sign up. 
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However, New Zealand would only accept the United States desire for a swift 
settlement on the condition that its security concerns were put at ease through a 
security arrangement with the United States and Australia that would guarantee 
New Zealand security. This also agreed with the Australian stance. 
During a February 1951 state visit to the United States Holland received an 
offer from Rusk of a possible security treaty between the United States, Australia 
and New Zealand. New Zealand seized the opportunity and Holland directed his 
External Affairs Minister Doidge to pursue the offer at a series of meeting which 
were to be held between the three parties in Canberra later the same month. 
This was a radical change in New Zealand's security outlo.ok. It was an 
acknowledgement the United Kingdom was no longer the international force of 
the past and that it was to the United States that New Zealand needed to turn to 
gain protection. 
As a result of the discussions in Canberra, a draft ANZUS Treaty was 
produced. New Zealand had obtained the security guarantee it had so eagerly 
sought. On 1 September 1952 the ANZUS Treaty was signed in San Francisco. 
New Zealand forged ahead with its policy of seeking a security arrangement 
with the United States even though, at times, the United Kingdom was opposed 
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to it. Wellington had decided that it was in New Zealand's interests to follow this 
policy and~would not be swayed by the 'Mother-Country.' 
Hypothesis 1: That New Zealand acted independent of any other countries 
when deciding its external affairs policy. 
As has been shown New Zealand did, during the 1942-52 period, act as an 
independent nation in the international arena. The relationship with the United 
Kingdom was very close as a result of cultural, historical and economic links. 
However these links did not extend as far dictating New Zealand's external 
affairs policies. 
There had been disagreements in the League of Nations over Abyssinia and 
Spain with the United Kingdom, yet it was the outbreak of the Second World War 
which saw New Zealand take its place as an independent country on the world 
stage. Unlike the First World War, New Zealand was not willing to go to war 
under the United Kingdom's declaration and as such declared war itself It also 
maintained firm control over its forces afield. 
New Zealand was no longer content to have its policy made in London. This 
was not a result of any anti-British feeling in Wellington, far from it, but rather 
because New Zealand felt it was now sufficiently capable and mature to make its 
own decisions. Wellington still continued to seek advice from both London and 
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Canberra and tried to formulate policy that would coincide with these two 
Commonwealth countries. However, this cannot be constructed as a lack of 
independence. Rather it demonstrates New Zealand was attempting to formulate 
effective and workable policies to meet its own needs. Being a small country 
New Zealand still needed to work in conjunction with others to achieve the 
outcomes it wanted. 
The entry of Japan into the war provided further evidence of New Zealand's 
independent stance. As with Germany in 1939, New Zealand declared war 
independently and also made the brave decision (although after consulting 
others) not to relocate its forces to the Pacific. New Zealand was not directed to 
take this course of action by any other country, rather it pragmatically agreed with 
the advice that it had been given. 
With the coming to power of the National party in 1949, New Zealand continued 
to exercise independence in its external affairs. The case can be made that 
when dispatching forces to Korea Holland was only following the lead of the 
United Kingdom, but this is not necessarily an indication of any lack of 
independence on New Zealand's part. The United Kingdom did not 'hold a gun 
to New Zealand's head.' Rather Holland decided (independently) that he wanted 
to have New Zealand involved for the reasons that he believed best suited New 
Zealand. 
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The ANZUS Pact further showed the validity of the hypothesis. New Zealand, 
along with Australia, pushed for such a treaty despite initial United States 
opposition and the concerns of the United Kingdom. If New Zealand's external 
relations was being determined by either of these two countries it is difficult to 
envisage they would have allowed New Zealand to pursue a policy both had 
reservations about. 
New Zealand clearly acted independently of other nations at all times during 
this period. Unsurprisingly, its policies did coincide on most occasions with those 
of its allies, however the decisions were solely New Zealand's. As such the 
hypothesis that New Zealand acted independent of any other countries when 
deciding its external affairs policy is valid. 
Hypothesis 2: That New Zealand acted in a way to benefit New Zealand first 
and not another country. 
From the Japanese entry into the Second World War in 1942 to the signing of 
the ANZUS Pact of 1952, New Zealand followed policies which were designed 
first and foremost to service its own needs. 
With the Japanese advance through Asia and into the Pacific in early 1942, 
New Zealand's concern naturally focused on its own security. This demanded an 
important decision on the best use of the 2nd NZ Division located at the time in 
the Middle East. Far from being more concerned about the fighting in North 
Africa, as opposed to the North of Australia, New Zealand realised the best 
course of action for its security was to rely on the forces of the United States. 
The massive logistical effort required to move the New Zealand force closer to 
home outweighed any benefit that would be gained by such a move. Indeed, 
New Zealand could have been placed in greater danger 
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New Zealand's position with regard to the surrender and occupation of Japan 
also reflected New Zealand's primary concern for itself. Wellington was keen to 
see that Japan was not going to be in a position to threaten its shores again. 
The desire to keep the United Kingdom involved in this region was also clearly 
made with New Zealand's interests clearly at its core. 
This theme continued with the ANZUS Pact. The worry about a possible 
Japanese resurgence, and to a lesser degree the threat posed by communism to 
New Zealand, was behind the decision to seek a security agreement. There is 
no evidence at all to suggest that New Zealand entered into ANZUS to help other 
countries. Both the United States and Australia also benefited from the pact, but 
their concerns, particularly that of the former, were certainly not behind New 
Zealand's initiatives. 
During the period covered in this thesis, New Zealand acted in way to first 
benefit New Zealand and not another country and hence the hypothesis is valid. 
Hypothesis 3: That New Zealand was successful in achieving its external 
relation goals. 
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While it would be correct to say that New Zealand's involvement with the war 
against Japan was very small overall, and did not materially alter the outcome, it 
is true that New Zealand's policy was successful, as Japan was defeated. 
Following the occupation and surrender of Japan it would be accurate to say 
that New Zealand was unsuccessful in promoting its policies though the concern 
about a new Japanese threat never materialised. Wellington was unable to get 
the 'hard' final settlement terms it had wanted against the Japanese as the 
United States unilaterally forced through its own policies. Again, the policy of 
trying to keep the United Kingdom involved in the region was also a failure. The 
United Kingdom was simply unable to sustain a large enough presence in the 
region to satisfy Wellington despite the urging of New Zealand; other priorities 
assumed importance for the old 'Mother Country.' 
However, New Zealand was successful in its goal of obtaining a security 
agreement with the United States and Australia. This was perhaps the major 
external affairs achievement of the post-war period and became the cornerstone 
of New Zealand's security policy for the next thirty-two years. 
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